Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
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THE BATTLE OF CHINA’ S HISTORY<br />
ills annually cause 300,000 deaths <strong>and</strong> cost $200 billion – equivalent to<br />
10 per cent of <strong>the</strong> gross domestic product – due to loss of work, medical<br />
expenses <strong>and</strong> government outlays’ (Kwong 2006).<br />
Some policies result in environmental degradation even when <strong>the</strong>ir<br />
ostensible goal is <strong>the</strong> exact opposite. Take <strong>the</strong> case of Yunnan, where 94<br />
per cent of <strong>the</strong> l<strong>and</strong> area is mountainous, as an example. In 1981, <strong>the</strong><br />
CCP <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> State Council issued a policy document 5 known as San<br />
ding or <strong>the</strong> ‘The three fixed’: fixed mountain rights, fixed <strong>for</strong>estry rights<br />
<strong>and</strong> fixed responsibility. The policy was designed to copy <strong>the</strong> so-called<br />
success of <strong>the</strong> responsibility system in agriculture by producing a kind<br />
of <strong>for</strong>estry responsibility system. It was assumed that giving individual<br />
households <strong>the</strong> right to manage sections of <strong>for</strong>estry would<br />
ensure that <strong>the</strong> same households would look after <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>est in a<br />
responsible fashion. What happened instead was that <strong>the</strong> locals used<br />
<strong>the</strong>ir rights to chop down <strong>the</strong> trees <strong>and</strong> sell <strong>the</strong>m. Within three years,<br />
<strong>the</strong> once thickly <strong>for</strong>ested mountains were chopped bare. Any <strong>for</strong>est<br />
that was left was due to <strong>the</strong> impossibility of access. Now <strong>the</strong> locals<br />
have nothing to rely on <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong>ir livelihood <strong>and</strong> are dependent on<br />
government h<strong>and</strong>outs (Zhang Deyuan 2005).<br />
White cat, black cat: <strong>the</strong> argument of efficiency versus fairness<br />
From <strong>the</strong> late 1970s until his death, Deng Xiaoping was adamant that<br />
<strong>the</strong>re should be no debate on whe<strong>the</strong>r China was a socialist or capitalist<br />
country, because he believed <strong>the</strong> debate would pose an obstacle<br />
to development. He proposed a deliberate strategy of ambiguity so<br />
that capitalist elements could creep into <strong>the</strong> system. This pragmatic<br />
approach was ideologically legitimized by <strong>the</strong> philosophy that<br />
‘practicum is <strong>the</strong> sole criterion of truth’, which was summarized by <strong>the</strong><br />
post-<strong>Mao</strong> Deng-led authorities as one of <strong>the</strong> essential elements of <strong>Mao</strong><br />
Zedong Thought. 6<br />
What was clear to China’s political <strong>and</strong> intellectual elite policy<br />
makers was that <strong>the</strong> Western style of life <strong>and</strong> material abundance was<br />
to be desired, <strong>and</strong> if a way could be found to achieve that goal, it did<br />
not matter what ‘ism’ it took. It does not matter whe<strong>the</strong>r <strong>the</strong> cat is<br />
white or black so long as it catches mice. This strategy of development<br />
eventually rendered <strong>the</strong> debate about <strong>the</strong> colour of <strong>the</strong> cat seemingly a<br />
non-issue. Since <strong>the</strong>n, even though <strong>the</strong>re has been a split between <strong>the</strong><br />
so-called New Left <strong>and</strong> Liberals among <strong>the</strong> intellectual elite (Gao 2004,<br />
Kipnis 2003, Zhang Xudong 2001 <strong>and</strong> Hu 2004), <strong>the</strong> dominant voice in<br />
China’s intellectual discourse has been economic rationalism, which<br />
argues that efficiency should take priority over fairness. The underlying<br />
assumption is that if <strong>and</strong> when efficiency leads to greater wealth<br />
in <strong>the</strong> country, everyone will be better off.<br />
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