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Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution

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THE BATTLE OF CHINA’ S HISTORY<br />

communist victory in 1949, or <strong>the</strong>ir descendants, have returned. Businesspeople<br />

from Hong Kong or Taiwan, who know how to bribe<br />

bureaucrats <strong>and</strong> how to exploit cheap labour because of <strong>the</strong>ir cultural<br />

<strong>and</strong> language advantages, skilfully play this comprador role. The<br />

general picture is that a Western company has <strong>the</strong> soft technology, such<br />

as design <strong>and</strong> marketing, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong> comprador manages <strong>the</strong> production<br />

<strong>and</strong> supplies <strong>the</strong> products to <strong>the</strong> company. Companies like Nike, <strong>for</strong><br />

instance, demonstrate considerable concern about design <strong>and</strong> selling,<br />

but little concern when it comes to how <strong>the</strong>ir products are made. The<br />

compradors take orders from Nike <strong>and</strong> are slave drivers in China who<br />

supply cheap shoes to Nike.<br />

Apart from <strong>the</strong> return of pre-1949 compradors <strong>the</strong>re has been a rise of<br />

new Chinese compradors who are engaged with trade or who work <strong>for</strong><br />

<strong>for</strong>eign firms. Those people ei<strong>the</strong>r directly control <strong>the</strong> trade or smooth<br />

<strong>the</strong> greasy operations <strong>for</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign firms <strong>and</strong> reap rewards in <strong>the</strong> process.<br />

The end result is that a few Chinese get rich but <strong>the</strong> state gets virtually<br />

nothing in return. In spite of special treatment of tax concessions such as<br />

no tax <strong>for</strong> <strong>the</strong> first five years of operation <strong>and</strong> lower tax rates than<br />

required <strong>for</strong> Chinese firms, <strong>for</strong>eign enterprises still uses Chinese administrative<br />

<strong>and</strong> legal loopholes to avoid tax. According to a recent study by<br />

<strong>the</strong> Chinese Bureau of Statistics, up to 2005 two-thirds of all <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>eign<br />

firms claimed losses (Zhonghua gongshang shibao, 28 March 2007; see also<br />

Fuxi 2007). One of <strong>the</strong> ways of doing this is ‘transfer pricing’, that is,<br />

inflating <strong>the</strong> prices of imported goods <strong>and</strong> deflating <strong>the</strong> prices of <strong>the</strong><br />

assembled commodities that are mostly exported. The Chinese<br />

compradors are rewarded in <strong>the</strong> process when <strong>the</strong>y help <strong>the</strong> transnational<br />

companies exploit <strong>the</strong> tax loopholes. According to Chinese official<br />

sources, ‘tax evasion by multinationals costs <strong>the</strong> country 30 billion yuan<br />

(US$3.88 billion) in tax revenue each year’ (Chung 2007).<br />

The Chinese compradors also use a two-tier system to create <strong>the</strong>ir<br />

own ‘<strong>for</strong>eign companies’ by first transferring funds overseas as investments<br />

in ‘suitcase’ or ‘paper’ companies, <strong>and</strong> <strong>the</strong>n repatriating <strong>the</strong>m as<br />

<strong>for</strong>eign investment in China. According to Mei Xinyu, a senior<br />

researcher at <strong>the</strong> Chinese Academy of International Trade <strong>and</strong><br />

Economic Cooperation under <strong>the</strong> Ministry of Commerce, ‘of China’s<br />

utilized FDI of $72.4 billion in 2005, a third was Chinese investment<br />

overseas that came back disguised as <strong>for</strong>eign capital take advantage of<br />

<strong>the</strong> tax breaks’ (Chung 2007). 3<br />

Many of <strong>the</strong> sons <strong>and</strong> daughters of <strong>the</strong> CCP office holders, <strong>the</strong><br />

‘princelings’, have joined <strong>the</strong> comprador class in its rise. According to<br />

Gilley (1998), Jiang Mianheng, son of <strong>the</strong> <strong>for</strong>mer General Secretary of<br />

<strong>the</strong> CCP, who gained a doctorate from Drexel University in Philadelphia,<br />

become a key player in Shanghai business, starting with <strong>the</strong><br />

city-owned investment firm Shanghai Alliance Investment, serving on<br />

[ 183 ]

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