Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
Battle for China's Past : Mao and the Cultural Revolution
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Conclusion: truth <strong>and</strong> belief<br />
values of socialism <strong>and</strong><br />
China’s future direction<br />
The image we usually have in <strong>the</strong> West of contemporary China is that<br />
it is a highly regimented, regulated <strong>and</strong> strictly controlled society.<br />
China is usually interpreted as a dictatorship (ei<strong>the</strong>r party dictatorship<br />
or personal dictatorship), or a country run by a state of factional politics,<br />
or a state of ideological control. Clearly each of <strong>the</strong>se approaches<br />
offers some insight into <strong>the</strong> mechanism of Chinese politics, but what<br />
actually happens is often <strong>the</strong> result of <strong>the</strong> interactions of many factors<br />
that cannot be explained by a single conceptual model. Much of what<br />
has happened in post-<strong>Mao</strong> rural China, <strong>for</strong> instance, is often <strong>the</strong> result<br />
of unintended policy, <strong>and</strong> sometimes a result of lack of regulation or<br />
management from <strong>the</strong> state. To interpret what happens at <strong>the</strong> grassroots<br />
we need to have a much more sophisticated conceptual approach<br />
that involves people’s truth <strong>and</strong> belief values.<br />
Truth <strong>and</strong> belief values of a political discourse<br />
We could advance our underst<strong>and</strong>ing of what has been happening in<br />
China a step fur<strong>the</strong>r by suggesting that <strong>the</strong> power of political discourse<br />
at any given time may be too strong <strong>for</strong> a change at that particular time<br />
until <strong>and</strong> unless <strong>the</strong> truth <strong>and</strong> belief values of that discourse are<br />
discredited. A brief outline of <strong>the</strong> so-called rural re<strong>for</strong>m will illustrate<br />
<strong>the</strong> point. The household responsibility system (baogan zhi) that eventually<br />
led to <strong>the</strong> collapse of <strong>the</strong> collective system was not conceptually<br />
original, nor politically innovative. Be<strong>for</strong>e <strong>the</strong> system was officially<br />
sanctioned all over <strong>the</strong> country many villagers practised baogan zhi in<br />
various <strong>for</strong>ms in many places on <strong>and</strong> off in <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mao</strong> era. It was off<br />
sometimes when agricultural policy was more radical <strong>and</strong> on at o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
times, depending also on inclinations of local leaders. 1978, two years<br />
after <strong>the</strong> death of <strong>Mao</strong> <strong>and</strong> after <strong>the</strong> arrest of <strong>the</strong> <strong>Mao</strong>ist radicals <strong>the</strong><br />
Gang of Four, is considered a watershed year of re<strong>for</strong>m as it was <strong>the</strong>n<br />
that a resolution on rural China was passed by <strong>the</strong> central committee<br />
of <strong>the</strong> CCP. But in fact that 1978 resolution explicitly stated that baogan<br />
zhi was not allowed (bu xu). In a 1979 central government document<br />
<strong>the</strong> word bu xu (not allowed) was changed to bu yao (do not); <strong>and</strong> only<br />
in 1980 did a CCP document state that baogan zhi was sanctioned as a<br />
kind of socialist responsibility system. It was not until <strong>the</strong> mid-1980s<br />
[ 191 ]