DYB2011-Part-II-web

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2011: Part II
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that the complete elimination of all such weapons was the only guarantee
against their use and proliferation.
Fissile materials
According to the schedules set by the three initial Presidents of 2011,
debates on fissile materials were held on 3 February under the presidency of
Marius Grinius, 15 on 3 March under President Pedro Oyarce16 and on 17 and
18 May, under the guidance of Giovanni Manfredi (Italy) who was appointed
coordinator17 of the item.
During the deliberations, delegations discussed issues such as definitions,
verification and stockpiles, and many speakers made concrete proposals on
how to move forward on these topics.
Numerous references were made during these sessions to the Shannon
Report (CD/1299 of 24 March 1995) and to the Shannon Mandate contained
therein, whose continued validity was not questioned.
The principles on which an FMCT should be based, in particular, that it
should be non-discriminatory, multilateral and effectively and internationally
verifiable were reaffirmed.
The question of stockpiles was addressed in depth on various occasions
during the informal meetings, confirming the opinion that, should negotiations
begin, it would constitute one of the most contentious issues.
As in the past, some delegations insisted that the FMCT should limit
itself to banning future production of fissile materials, while others reiterated
the need to add at least a minimum of provisions regarding present stocks.
In spite of this difference, however, it was generally understood that the
question would inevitably surface during negotiations, and that the Shannon
Mandate—as it stood—allowed this.
Considerable attention was also devoted to the topic of definition and
verification. In general, the usefulness of basing definitions on International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) criteria and designing verification on
its comprehensive safeguards system was recognized. Concerns were,
however, expressed on the extra burden to the Agency’s budget that this
would entail. Hence, an FMCT would require financial assessment clauses
in order to conclude a feasible and credible treaty, able to contribute both to
non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament.
During the first and second parts of the 2011 session of the Conference,
Australia and Japan hosted three “experts side events” 18 on various aspects of
the proposed FMCT. In hosting these events, both States were motivated by
the Secretary-General’s call to the CD on 26 January for “a basic process to
15 CD/PV.1202.
16 CD/PV.1213.
17 CD/1907 and CD/1918.
18 CD/1906, CD/1909 and CD/1917.