DYB2011-Part-II-web

Disarmament resolutions and decisions listed by chapter
First Committee. Belarus delivered a general statement, pointing out the four
decades that the Committee had been considering the subject of the prohibition of the
development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD).
From both the humanitarian and financial points of view, it was important to prohibit
WMD at the development stage rather than to try to prevent their proliferation once
they already existed. It added that proof of the development or creation of new WMD
had not been found. Belarus hoped that the draft resolution would once again be
adopted by consensus, adding that it was important for the matter to remain on the
agendas of the First Committee and the Conference on Disarmament.
After voting against the draft resolution, the United States expressed its belief
that the international community should focus its efforts on the proliferation of
known types of WMD, both by States violating existing treaties and also by non-State
actors. Since the 1948 definition of WMD had been set forth, no new types of WMD
had appeared on the horizon. It also stressed that the attention and efforts of the
international community should not be directed away from existing threats.
66/35. Implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
Weapons and on Their Destruction
In this annual resolution, the General
Assembly emphasized that the universality
of the Chemical Weapons Convention was
fundamental to the achievement of its objective
and purpose, acknowledged progress made in
the implementation of the action plan for the
universality of the Convention, and called upon all
States that had not yet done so to become parties to
the Convention without delay.
First Committee. The Islamic Republic of Iran joined the consensus, having
been a victim of the use of chemical weapons. It said that the destruction of all
chemical weapons stockpiles and their production facilities remained the key objective
of the Convention. It stressed full compliance by major possessor State parties with the
April 2012 extended deadline. Otherwise, the raison d’être of the Convention would
be seriously challenged and its credibility significantly tarnished. Regrettably, the draft
resolution lacked an accurate reflection of that important aspect of the implementation
of the Convention.
66/65. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and
Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
In adopting this annual resolution, the
General Assembly noted with appreciation that two
additional States had acceded to the Convention.
It welcomed the information and data provided to
date, as well as the several measures to update the
mechanism for the transmission of information in
the framework of confidence-building measures
Introduced by: Poland (17 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook,
Part I, pp. 60-62.
Introduced by: Hungary (26 Oct.)
GA vote: w/o vote (2 Dec.)
1st Cttee vote: w/o vote (26 Oct.)
For text and sponsors, see Yearbook, Part
I, pp. 192-194.
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