DYB2011-Part-II-web

Related issues, including information and outreach
educate each other and build trust which will inform and facilitate the formal
process once the CD adopts its work programme”. The Chairs considered that
the side events met this call and achieved modest but useful results.
The side events offered the opportunity for CD delegations and experts
from capitals to exchange views on a number of FMCT-related topics, notably
definitions and verification concepts. The discussions benefited from the
active participation of Bruno Pellaud (Switzerland) and representatives of
the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.
Representatives of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs and
UNIDIR were also present at the side events.
The Chairman’s reports of these side events were contained in documents
CD/1906, CD/1909 and CD/1917.
Negative security assurances
According to the schedules set by the first three Presidents of 2011,
debates on negative security assurances were held on 10 February under the
presidency of Marius Grinius, 19 on 10 March under the presidency of Pedro
Oyarce20 and on 19 May under the guidance of Fodé Seck (Senegal), the
appointed coordinator21 of the item.
The discussions were similar to those held previously and basically
reflected two groups with divergent positions—those who wanted a legally
binding framework to be negotiated in the CD and others who wanted such
assurances to be provided by all the nuclear-weapon States through established
nuclear-weapon-free zones.
Members noted that statements made by the nuclear-weapon States
on numerous occasions that they would not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States were insufficient, given that the
statements were unilateral, conditional and revocable.
Some delegations maintained that the assurances given in relation to
nuclear-weapon-free zones were inadequate, conditional and geographically
limited. Nevertheless, the creation of such zones in Africa, South-East Asia,
Central Asia and South America, as well as Mongolia’s nuclear-weapon-free
status, were recognized as important forward-looking steps.
It was also mentioned that granting negative security assurances would
constitute a quid pro quo for States that renounced nuclear weapons and
hence such assurances would help to combat proliferation. In that sense,
granting legally binding assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States would
19 CD/PV.1204.
20 CD/PV.1215.
21 CD/1907 and CD/1918.
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