DYB2011-Part-II-web

United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2011: Part II
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Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi reportedly said that his country was
ready to resume negotiations on the basis of the Russian proposal.
Syrian Arab Republic
With respect to the outstanding issues pertaining to the nuclear
programme of the Syrian Arab Republic, the IAEA was for the first time able
to draw major conclusions pertaining to its investigation, although certain key
issues remained unresolved. On 24 May, the IAEA Director General submitted
to the Board of Governors a report entitled “Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic”.
With respect to the Dair Alzour site, destroyed by Israel in September
2007, the Agency concluded that “the destroyed building was very likely a
nuclear reactor [that] should have been declared by Syria pursuant to Articles
42 and 43 of its Safeguards Agreement”. In particular, the IAEA assessed that
the “features of the destroyed building are comparable to those of a gas cooled
graphite moderated reactor”. The Agency also reported that it was unable to
provide any assessment concerning the nature or operational status of three
other locations that it had determined to be functionally related to the Dair
Alzour site. The Agency continued to express regret that the Syrian Arab
Republic had not cooperated since June 2008 in response to the Agency’s
questions on this matter.
With respect to the detection of human-origin uranium particles found
at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor in 2008 and in 2009, the Agency
concluded that, based on the information provided by the Syrian Arab
Republic and the results of the Agency’s verification activities, the former’s
explanations for the origin of the particles “are not inconsistent with the
Agency’s findings”. Therefore, the Agency decided to henceforth follow up on
the matter only through the routine operation of safeguards.
On 9 June, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2011/41, 35
in which it, inter alia, determined that the Syrian Arab Republic’s “undeclared
construction of a nuclear reactor” and failure to provide design information
on the Dair Alzour site “constitute non-compliance with its obligations under
its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of
the Agency’s Statute”. The Board called upon the Syrian Arab Republic “to
remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement” and to
respond “positively and without delay” to the Director General’s requests for
information “so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to
the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria’s nuclear program pursuant to Syria’s
Safeguards Agreement”. Furthermore, the Board decided to report the Syrian
35 Available from http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-41.pdf
(accessed 9 May 2012). Adopted by a recorded vote, with 17 States in favour, 6 against,
11 abstentions and 1 not voting.