Financial systems and development
Financial systems and development
Financial systems and development
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Chapter 2 stressed the roles of risk, information, ing financial institutions. Toward this end, they<br />
<strong>and</strong> transaction costs in determining the supply of nationalized the largest, <strong>and</strong> in some cases all,<br />
finance. In developing countries, investment was commercial banks; in Costa Rica, India, Indonesia,<br />
relatively risky. Production was in new sectors <strong>and</strong> Mexico, <strong>and</strong> Pakistan, for example, the majority of<br />
used technologies unfamiliar to the work force, en- banking system assets are government-owned. In<br />
trepreneurs <strong>and</strong> managers were inexperienced, addition, they created <strong>and</strong> supported develop<strong>and</strong><br />
marketing channels had not been developed. ment finance institutions (DFIs), which were spe-<br />
Natural calamities <strong>and</strong> fluctuating commodity cifically m<strong>and</strong>ated to provide long-term finance to<br />
prices could drastically affect the incomes of particular sectors. Governments applied interest<br />
farmers. Government policy was a constraint <strong>and</strong> rate <strong>and</strong> credit allocation controls to public <strong>and</strong><br />
a source of uncertainty: trade <strong>and</strong> pricing policies private institutions alike <strong>and</strong> ordered banks to<br />
discriminated against exports <strong>and</strong> agriculture; de- open branches in rural areas. Bilateral <strong>and</strong> multilatvaluations<br />
<strong>and</strong> tariff changes could radically alter a eral aid agencies participated in targeted credit<br />
firm's competitive position <strong>and</strong> the cost of servic- programs by providing financial support <strong>and</strong> instiing<br />
its foreign debt; trade <strong>and</strong> foreign exchange tutional assistance.<br />
restrictions could reduce access to needed imports. Governments in high-income countries also in-<br />
Volatile inflation caused abrupt swings in relative tervened in their financial <strong>systems</strong>. Although they<br />
prices, periodic recessions reduced product de- exerted some influence over the flow of credit, inm<strong>and</strong>,<br />
<strong>and</strong> government borrowing crowded firms terest rate <strong>and</strong> credit controls were less extensive<br />
out of the financial markets.<br />
than in developing countries. The principal em-<br />
Furthermore, the instruments <strong>and</strong> markets phasis was instead on measures designed to safethrough<br />
which risks could be pooled or transferred guard the stability of the financial system. In dewere<br />
undeveloped. Financiers lacked the tools to veloping countries, however, governments paid<br />
evaluate, price, <strong>and</strong> monitor risks. The weakness inadequate attention to regulatory <strong>and</strong> prudential<br />
of accounting, auditing, <strong>and</strong> disclosure regulations matters, to the detriment of their financial<br />
limited the information available to lenders about <strong>systems</strong>.<br />
borrowers. Legal procedures for collateral <strong>and</strong><br />
foreclosure were poorly specified. These factors, Government intervention<br />
together with uncertainty about borrowers' pros- in credit allocation<br />
pects <strong>and</strong> the future inflation rate, deterred creditors<br />
from providing long-term funds; lack of infor- Developing country governments have played a<br />
mation <strong>and</strong> collateral discouraged banks from large role in credit allocation. For example, in Pakilending<br />
to farmers <strong>and</strong> small businesses.<br />
stan in 1986, 70 percent of new lending by the na-<br />
Governments could have tried to increase the tional banks, which dominate the banking system,<br />
willingness of creditors to provide long-term fi- was targeted by government, although this pronance<br />
<strong>and</strong> equity capital by modernizing legal sys- portion was reduced substantially by 1988. In India<br />
tems <strong>and</strong> making contracts more easily enforce- about one-half of bank assets had to be placed in<br />
able; by clarifying property rights <strong>and</strong> improving reserve requirements or government bonds, <strong>and</strong><br />
title transfer <strong>and</strong> loan security; by improving bank 40 percent of the remainder had to be lent to priorregulation<br />
<strong>and</strong> supervision; by training accoun- ity sectors at controlled interest rates. In Yugotants<br />
<strong>and</strong> auditors; <strong>and</strong> by ensuring adequate dis- slavia in 1986, 58 percent of short-term loans were<br />
closure of information. Chapter 6 discusses such directed credits. In Brazil in 1987, government<br />
changes in more detail. But institution building credit programs accounted for more than 70 pertakes<br />
time. Underst<strong>and</strong>ably, many governments cent of the credit outst<strong>and</strong>ing to the public <strong>and</strong><br />
wanted faster results. Moreover, many wanted to private sectors. In Turkey in the early 1980s,<br />
use the financial system for such purposes as allo- roughly three-quarters of all financial system adcating<br />
resources to projects with high social re- vances were made at government directive or at<br />
turns, redistributing income, reducing costs in preferential interest rates, or both, although the<br />
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), <strong>and</strong> offsetting the proportion has since fallen (see Box 4.1). In Malayeffects<br />
of an overvalued exchange rate <strong>and</strong> restric- sia directed credit has accounted for an estimated<br />
tive trade policies.<br />
30 percent of bank portfolios.<br />
Rather than lay the foundations of a sound fi- Many such regimes were immensely complinancial<br />
system, most governments concentrated cated. At one point Korea had 221 formal directed<br />
on intervention designed to channel resources to credit programs. In 1986 the Philippines had fortyactivities<br />
that they felt were poorly served by exist- nine schemes for agriculture <strong>and</strong> twelve for indus-<br />
55