Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

ment retaliation, and a formal grievance system.2') Two years later, Mayor RobertWagner (whose father had authored the National Labor Relations Act) extendedcollective bargaining rights to police officers, and the PBA won better wagesand retirement benefits as a result. 10 In exchange, the PBA agreed to a no-strikeclause and a bar from affiliating with other unions. IIThe leaders of the police associations (PBA and FOP alike) were only tooglad to protect their positions from the competition of the Teamsters orAmerican Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) ,but no-strike provisions proved more difficult to enforce. The authoritieslearned this the hard way in 1967 when the Detroit police staged a sick-out(nicknamed the "Blue Flu") . A year later, the Newark police did the same, andthe Chicago cops threatened their own Blue Flu epidemic." In 1969, theAtlanta FOP organized "Operation No Case," in which the police issued fewertickets and overlooked minor offenses.'l The next year, Atlanta officers repeatedthe tactic without union approval, initiating a ten-week slowdown.l• Thetrend continued throughout the seventies, with strikes in Baltimore, Cleveland,Memphis, and New Orleans.i) When faced with a walkout or slowdown, theauthorities usually decided that the pragmatic need to get the cops back towork trumped the city government's long-term interest in diminishing therank and file's power . .'6The Detroit sick-out provides an interesting illustration of the forces at workin these conflicts. The action began on May 16, 1967, with a ticket slow-down.The police continued to pull over speeding motorists, thus technically enforcingthe law. But they issued warnings rather than citations.v Overnight thenumber of traffic tickets dropped to one-half its previous level. Between May16 and June 14, the number of tickets was down 66.9 percent compared tothe previous thirty days, and 71.5 percent relative to the same period a yearbefore. It's estimated that the effort cost the city abuut $15,000 each day.;" OnJune 6, the DPOA escalated the conflict when its members voted to stop volunteeringfor overtime. The following week, police commanders responded to thedisruption by suspending 61 officers. Then, on June 15, 323 cops called in sick.39DPOA president Carl Parsell denied that the action constituted a strike,but said: "Policemen for the first time are joining the labor movement. Theyare beginning to think and act like a trade union."40 "The city filed a lawsuitagainst the DPOA, instituted emergency twelve-hour shifts, and alerted theNational Guard. The strike not only continued, but grew. On June 17, 800 ofthe city's 2,700 officers were absent. Of these, 170 had been suspended, 459were "sick," and fifteen cited family emergencies. As the conflict escalated,each side grew increasingly eager to find a resolution, and on June 20, a tentativeagreement was reached. The next day, the police returned to work.41The proposed agreement granted the DPOA changes in policy and discipline,and established a grievance procedure, but it was not at all clear that thefight was over, or which side would prevail. All "non-economic" issues were settled,but there was still the matter of wages, and the deal had to be approved bythe city counci1.42 The tension persisted. Commanders had only a tenuous graspon the loyalties of their subordinates. But then a funny thing happened-theDetroit riot of 1967. With the Black community in open revolt, the cops, the city124