Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

he could ideniliY his attackers, he did not press charges. I') 'the impotence of localw authorities was particularly felt in areas where they were dependent on thet: federal government for their power. As the federal government became increas-ingly reluctant to insert itself-especially militarily-into local affairs, city andU county officials were left vulnerable. Sheriff] oseph P. Doyle of Madison County,Alabama, worried, "I have nobody to protect me."20When Klan-type violence occurred, arrests were unusual, prosec'Utions rare,and convictions almost unknown. The attitudes (and sometimes, involvement)of police officers and sheriffs certainly impeded the enforcement of the law,but this was only one of many obstacles standing in the way of convictions.Prosecutors were unwilling to press such cases, and magistrates were oftenglad to dismiss them. Klansmen frequently dominated juries-including grandjuries and coroner's juries. Witnesses and victims, like Sheriff Norris, were intimidatedand refused to testify, while Klan members were eager to swear falsealibis on one another's behalf.21The law, when it did oppose Klan activity, did so in times and places wherethe Klan was politically weak.Wherever Union men were numerous and sufficiently well organized to sustainthe local authorities ... [Arkansas Governor Powell] Clayton encouragedsheriffs to mobilize them as posses, and they were used to good effect. Thusthe sheriff of Carroll County managed to quell the small-scale terror there,even if he failed to catch the criminals. In Fulton County, where the governorhad to send in reinforcements from other counties and make use of Monk'sMissouri volunteers, the policy contributed to a mutual escalation but wasultimately successful. 22Even then, the usual form of conflict was not open warfare or even vigorousenforcement of the law, but a kind of rivalry or dual power. The police ano thpKlan became counterbalancing forces rather than outright antagonists. Undersuch conditions, police may have limited the Klan's worst atrocities, but they didlittle to protect Black people from routine abuse and intimidation. ,j likewise, theKlem, while not usually driving L1.e shedff out of town or making good on theirthreats against him, limited the scope of his authority and greatly restricted hisagenda (especially where the sheriff was a Republican) . In Homer, Louisiana,the sheriff gave up policing whole areas of the parish where the Klan was strongest.24 One Texan sheriff found it impossible to raise a posse against Klan activity;White citizens told him derisively to "Call on your nigger friends."'sBut usually , law enforcement agents were unwilling to move against the Klan,even when they were backed by federal military force.26 And they were almostnever willing to avail themselves of the one source of power that may have beenmost readily mobilized against Klan activity-the Black population. Even whenfaced with widespread lawlessness, White officials proved unwilling to arm andrally their Black constituency.27 It may be that they worried such a move wouldcreate a panic among White people and provoke further violence, or it may be thatthey feared creating a Black resistance that they could not then control. 2K Whateverthe reasons, the result was disastrous for American Black people.As renegade states were reincorporated into the Union and the federal commitmentto Reconstruction waned, Black people were returned to something80