Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

class lines-that is, they organize police as police, not as workers.The police exhibit an institutional unity that is fundamentally different thanthe class consciousness underlying union activity. The chief difference is thatdespitefissures along race lines, disputes between superiors and subordinates,and intra-departmental rivalries-a sense of shared identity extends to everybranch of police organizations and is felt at every level, from the highest commanderto the rookie on the beat. This solidarity helps the commanders maintainthe loyalty of their troops and, as mentioned before, it also leads cops of allranks to cover up for each other. Not only do street cops hide one another'smistakes from those above them, but superiors shield subordinates from outsidescrutiny.'56Such managerial complicity reinforces the sense of identity and group cohesion,thus reducing the possibilities for conflict within the department. And asthe rank and file have become a more vocal, and more powerful, political constituency,some commanders have extended this strategy in order to share inthe benefits of militancy. 157 A savvy commander can secure the loyalty of histroops by participating in their revolt, providing himself with the platform forleadership and at the same time retaining a militant force prepared to backhim up in clashes with civil authorities.Police unions exercise influence over departments in ways other unions canonly envy. However, apart from localized (usually individual) grievances, the officers and their managers share interests, perspectives, and a sense of identity. Inthe end, their institutional identification is superior to their class consciousness.To a very large extent, police departments achieve internal peace by subsumingthe interests of both workers and managers to those of the institution. Even economicissues, like wages and hours, become common ground for cops and theirbosses: both want increases in department budgets. The officers, of course,enjoy a higher standard of living as a result, and police administrators can lookforward to more funding, larger departments, better morale, and an easier timeattracting recruits. For this reason some scholars describe police contract negotiationsas exercises in "collusive bargaining."Margaret Levi explains:As the literature on private labor unions so often illustrates, collective bargainingoften serves as a device of social control. It channels conflict and setsits terms. But collusive bargaining goes one step further: it enables managementand labor negotiators to cooperate actively with each other. (In order toconvince their constituencies of their motives the bargaining teams fight publicly,but privately they compromise.) By engaging in collusive bargaining,city leaders gain credibility with the public for being tough, gain some assuranceof relatively uninterrupted service delivery, and regain some power tomake programmatic innovations. Of course, in return, they must grant someof the union's demands. iSHUnion leaders, meanwhile, put on a similar act for the benefit of their constituency.As a result, they are able to deliver gains to the union members and retaintheir positions of influence-all without the risks of genuine conflict.As an exanlple of this collusive approach, Levi cites the relationship betweenthe Fraternal Order of Police and Atlanta Police Chief John Inman: 'The chief139