Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

Under these conditions, though it may require shifting power and resources tothe criminal justice system at the expense of other state enterprises, the policemay-in part because of their high level of independent organization-be effectivelyused by the dominant group. But if the police mutiny for either material orideological reasons, or if they begin to make demands that the government cannotaccommodate, police control of institutional resources may threaten the power ofcivil authorities. Under such conditions, the civil authorities will feel compelled tobreak the police unions for the sake of preserving their own position.Is there a genuine danger of the police becoming the dominant force in society,displacing the civilian authorities? A simple armed revolt would invite interventionat the state or federal level, and would surely fail. But, it is conceivablethat the police could seize control of a local government if they proceededwith a combination of electoral and bully-boy tactics, on the Rizzo and Giulianimodel. For the police to seize control nationally, they would either need to benetworked on that level to a greater extent than they are presently, or else gainthe assistance of some other institution (e.g., the military).Is this a problem for the ruling class? Might it, under certain conditions, beto their favor? Logically speaking, it is possible that police-rule would favor theruling class. For example, capitalists may feel that the cops are more willing orable to defend their interests than are the civilian authorities. This may especiallybe the case if the authorities are so divided as to threaten regime collapse,while the police retain the unity necessary to take control and keep order. Thesignificance of the 1967 riots for the Detroit police strike is precisely this: thestate is more tolerant of some rivals than others, more willing to accept somechallenges to its power than others, and more ready to bargain with its longtermallies than to face defeat at the hands of immediate antagonists. As rebellionsgo, a police rebellion is particularly likely to gain the support of elites. Forthough police autonomy diminishes the power of the courts, civil government,and the rule of law vis-a-vis the police-it tends on the whole to preserve theinequalities extant in the status quo, including the inequalities inherent in theseother institutions.Of course, a full-force police state may make economic demands that proveinconvenient for business, and would almost certainly hinder the fully autonomousoperation of industry. But under certain conditions, especially those ofsocial crisis, the ruling class may prefer the stability of police or military rule,with all its accompanying constraints, to the possibility of facing extinction inthe course of revolution. (It was just such considerations that led the middleand upper classes to support Franco in Spain, and later, Pinochet in Chile.) 182More likely, however, is a "soft" coup, by which the police gradually gain adominant position within the local government, though never becoming theonly voice. The police could then form the center and base for a new kind ofmachine, building the necessary alliances with other social actors, but keepingthe power in the stationhouse rather than in the wards. Formally representativestructures could remain in place while the police use their power to squashdissent, engineer campaigns, and shape policies-making the most of theirpractical monopoly on organized violence. This would seem the natural ideal of"Blue Power," and while it may prove compatible to the needs of capitalism, it147