Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

140 Quoted in Bratton, Turnaround, 238.141 Bratton, Turnaround, 239. Parenti reads one further step into the process: "[Claptains lean onlieutenants, who lean on sergeants, who lean on beat cops, who, it could be said, lean on civilians."Parenti, Lockdown America, 76.142 Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 217-220; and Cordner, "Elements of Community Policing,"144.143 Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 218.144 Ibid.14'i National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders [The Kerner Commission], Report of theNational Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1968), 328.146 The well-titled book Ihe fron Fist and the Velvet Gloue was among the f, rst to observe thisrelationship. "In addition to the rise of new, sophisticated technologies, another striking developmentin the U. S. police apparatus during the sixties was the gtowth of new strategies of communitypenetration and 'citizen participation' that sought to integrate people in the process ofpolicing and to secure the legitimacy of the police system itself.. .. On the other side of the coin,the police have developed a variety of new 'tough' specialized units-special anti-riot and tacticalpatrol forces, 'special weapons' teams, and highly sophisticated intelligence units." Center forResearch on Criminal Justice, fron Fist, 7.Also: Center for Research on Criminal Justice, fron Fist, 30.147 See, for example: hank Kitson, Low fntemity Opermions: Subversion, Insurgency, Peace-Keeping(Harnden, CT: Archon Books, 1971),67, Kitson's work is discussed in greater detail in chapter 7.148 Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 129, For a description of a similar structure applied to SantaAna's block captain program, see: Skolnick and Bayley, New Blue Line, 28.149 Quoted in Jennifer Anderson, "Cops Jab at Drugs, One Bust at a Time," Portland Tribune,December 17, 2002, A3. The raid documented by the Tribune produced three arrests, all formisdemeanors. By the cops' own admission, such raids rarely result in jail time. Rather, the mostcommon consequence is eviction, leading to homelessness. Anderson, "Cops Jab at Drugs."] 50 Gates, Chief, 109.151 Goldstein, "Toward Community-Oriented Policing, " 12.152 "Apparently, some police agencies are integrating a military-model approach--occupy, suppressthrough force, and restore the affected territory-with community policing ideology, whichemphasizes taking back the neighborhood, creating a climate of order, and enacting preventiveand partnership strategies. Again, New York City's style of zero-tolerance community policingis the best-known example." DeMichele and Kraska, "Community Policing in Battle Garb," 96.See also: DeMichele and Kraska, "Community Policing in Battle Garb," 87-88.153 This strategy can sometimes be used to divide communities that have traditionally been a sourceof resistance against the police. For instance, "measures that target young people are frequentlycloaked in the notion that 'good citizens' must 'take back' and 'reclaim' their communities fromthe lawless elements that have been permitted to run amok. Increasing schisms of generation andclass within communities of color demarcate the boundaries between the 'good guys' and the'bad guys,'" Daniel HoSang, "The Economics of the New Brutality," ColorLines (Winter 1999-2(00),25.154 Quoted in Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Islands in the Street: Gangs and American Urban Society(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991),256,I 5'i Kitson advises: "In practical terms the most promising line of approach lies in separating the mass ofthose engaged in the campaign from the leadership hy the judicious promise of concessions, at the sametime imposing a period of calm by the use of government forces"" Having once succeeded in providinga breathing space by these means, it is most important to do three further things quickly. The first isto implement the promised concessions so as to avoid allegations of bad faith which may enahle thesuhversive leadership to regain control over certain sections of the people, The second is ro discover andneutralize the genuine subversive element, The third is to associate as many prominent members of thepopulation, especially those who have been engaged in non-violent action, with the government. Thislast technique is known in America as co-optation .... " Kitson, Low Intensity Operations, 87,156 "Because insurgency is bred in a climate of social malaise, US-backed counterinsurgency campaignsmust seek to neutralize public disaffection areas through social, political, and economicinitiatives aimed at 'winning hearts and minds' for the prevailing regime." Michael T. Klare,"The Interventionist Impulse: U. S. Militaty Doctrine for Low-Intensity Warfare," Low-IntensityWczrfore: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency, and Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael T. Klareand Peter Kornbluh (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988),75,157 Quoted in Bratton, Turnaround, 274. Political rivalry between Bratton and Giuliani preventedOperation Juggernaut's implementation, though a much more modest, localized version wastried in North Brooklyn. Bratton, Turnaround. 278 and 296.158 Quoted in Kraska and Kappeler, "Militarizing American Police," 473.295