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Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

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act <strong>in</strong> m<strong>in</strong>or or symbolic ways to keep the crowd <strong>in</strong> l<strong>in</strong>e. Negotiation with theGood Cop starts to look more attractive, as does play<strong>in</strong>g by the rules. This, <strong>in</strong>essence, is the strategy of political terrorism. The threat of violence is madeclear at every turn, <strong>and</strong> a politically useful climate of fear is carefully developed<strong>in</strong> order to control the population.ll7 Terrorism <strong>and</strong> co-optation are thus subsumedunder a s<strong>in</strong>gle system.This is someth<strong>in</strong>g we should learn to expect: the strategic use of both theGood Cop <strong>and</strong> the Bad Cop to control <strong>and</strong>, ultimately, to neutralize dissent.ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGESIf the 2000 Democratic Convention is any <strong>in</strong>dication, it would seem that the biggestchange s<strong>in</strong>ce 1968 is the broadened range of tactics available to police. <strong>Police</strong> comm<strong>and</strong>ershave ga<strong>in</strong>ed the ability to restra<strong>in</strong> officers when a Good Cop approach is <strong>in</strong>order. This is made possible by organizational changes connected, both historically<strong>and</strong> conceptually , to the process of militarization.Historically, the federal government prompted the development of NegotiatedManagement: the approach was shaped by the various commission reports,Supreme Court rul<strong>in</strong>gs, the development of the National Park Service permitsystem, <strong>and</strong> the availability of crowd control tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g at the U.S. Army Military<strong>Police</strong> School.llS (In this respect, local police have followed a course similar tothat of the National Guard, which was militarized after the 1877 strike wave.) Thisnew tra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g was specifically designed accord<strong>in</strong>g to the recommendations of theKerner <strong>and</strong> Eisenhower reports. I 19The Negotiated Management model arose at the same time <strong>and</strong> from thesame sources as the militarization of the police. To make sense of this, it isimportant to underst<strong>and</strong> that militarization does not only refer to police tactics<strong>and</strong> weaponry, but also to their mode of organization.120 The Kerner reportargued for it explicitly:The control of civil disturbances ... requires large numbers of discipl<strong>in</strong>edpersonnel, comparable to soldiers <strong>in</strong> a military unit, organized <strong>and</strong> tra<strong>in</strong>edto work as a team under a highly unified comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> control system.Thus when a civil disturbance occurs, a police department must suddenlyshift <strong>in</strong>to a new type of organization with different operational procedures.The <strong>in</strong>dividual officer must stop act<strong>in</strong>g <strong>in</strong>dependently <strong>and</strong> beg<strong>in</strong> toperform as a member of a closely supervised, discipl<strong>in</strong>ed team.121In short, it is military discipl<strong>in</strong>e that makes Negotiated Management a possibility,restra<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the <strong>in</strong>dividual officers while ma<strong>in</strong>ta<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g the potential for acoord<strong>in</strong>ated attack. This requires careful plann<strong>in</strong>g for the operation itself, <strong>and</strong> ahigh level of discipl<strong>in</strong>e among the officers so that each one acts accord<strong>in</strong>g to theestablished plan.122 Hence, militarization may <strong>in</strong>crease the organization's overallcapacity for violence, but may decrease <strong>in</strong>dividual acts of brutality, ow<strong>in</strong>g to ahigher level of discipl<strong>in</strong>e. 1 2 3Previously, <strong>in</strong>dividual acts of brutality were tolerated or encouraged asa means of controll<strong>in</strong>g the population through terror. But this approach canbe limit<strong>in</strong>g, as it renders negotiation <strong>and</strong> co-optation unlikely. Militarization195

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