Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

''waste'' their capabilities. To justify their continued existence, in particular theircontinued funding, they must be used. Inactivity is bureaucratic suicide. So the mission of these units expands. As it expands, their operations become normalized.Because riots and hostage-takings are relatively rare, SSU [Denver's SpecialService Unit] has had a lot of time on its hands, notwithstanding its demandingtraining requirements. So in its spare time, which has amounted to 90percent, it has been doing saturation patrolling.29Saturation patrolling offers one solution for the need to keep the paramilitaryteams busy between emergencies. Likewise, mundane police duties can beframed as "emergencies"-or alternately, the cops may actually create emergencies.This, in essence, is what the police do when they use paramilitaryunits to perform "warrant work.""Warrant work" is actually something of a misnomer, since many departmentsclaim that they don't need a warrant when they fear that evidencewould be destroyed during the time it takes to contact a judge.30 The searchesat issue are usually drug-related. One commander describes the procedure:"[Olur unit storms the residence with a full display of weaponry so we canget the drugs before they're flushed." il Paramilitary units usually specialize in"no-knock" or "dynamic" entries, meaning they avoid announcing their presenceuntil they've knocked down the door and are charging into the house.The LAPD, in its characteristic style, gave its SWAT team an armored car witha battering ram attached; rather than breaking down the door, the cops drivethe vehicle straight through the wallYNo-knock entries are dangerous for everyone involved-cops, suspects,bystanders. The raids usually occur before dawn; the residents are usuallyasleep, and then disoriented by the sudden intrusion. There is no warning,and sleepy residents may not always understand that the men breaking downtheir door are police. At the same time, police procedures allow terribly littleroom for error. Stan Goff, a retired Special Forces sergeant and SWAT trainer,says that he teaches cops to "Look at hands. If there's a weapon in theirhands during a dynamic entry, it does not matter what that weapon is doing.If there's a weapon in their hands, that person dies. It's automatic."33Predictably, these raids sometimes end in disaster. When the Visalia,California, SWAT team raided Alfonso Hernandez's apartment in 1998, the teenageropened fire, injuring one officer. The police fired back without restraint, hittingHernandez thirty-nine times and killing him on the spot. Some of their bulletstraveled through walls into neighboring apartments. In addition to Hernandez,another man in the apartment, Emiliano Trevino, was killed. Trevino was seekingrefuge in a corner when he was shot five times.34No-knock raids are inherently dangerous but, in most cases, altogetheravoidable. That is because there is usually no emergency before the raidbegins.35 Even if we take current drug laws for granted, it is clear that thisapproach places citizens and police alike at unnecessary risk. The fact that suchrisks are considered normal, and thought to represent an acceptable price formaintaining current policy, says a great deal about the prevalence of militarizedthinking. As Peter Kraska remarks:201