Kristian Williams - Our Enemies in Blue - Police and Power in America

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validated; Mayor Daley continued to defend his officers long after his excusescould be considered in any way credible.86 One further fact complicates thepicture: much of the convention-week violence was planned. Some reportersreceived warnings from cops with whom they were friendly; they were told thepolice intended to target members of the media.87With these facts in mind, thepolice riot seems to take on a different air. The cops did not simply panic; theyknew what they meant to do. While internal discipline broke down, the policeaction as a whole filled its intended role. Indeed, the cops had been encouraged,and then protected, by the mayor. Certain commanders may have beenappalled by what they saw-or may simply have been afflicted by the managerial need to assert their authority in a crisis-but this did nothing to affect thebehavior of the institution as a whole.Finally, it should be noted that the Escalated Force strategy itself contributesto the likelihood of a police riot. The police riot, by Stark's analysis, movesalong exactly the same lines as the Escalated Force model. (In fact, Stark refersto his six-stage articulation as an "Escalation Model.',)88 The crowd controloperation ends and the riot begins at the point where discipline breaks down.The implementation of the Escalated Force strategy tends to race toward thispoint. In practice, police commanders "tend to maximize rather than minimizethe use of force in order to maximize officer safety and to maximize dispersal"even though "command control and tactical integrity tend to collapse in contactwith crowds and as greater force is applied." 89 In other words, as the amountof force is increased, the likelihood that discipline will be lost and that excessiveforce will be used also increases. This lapse, as we've seen, was generallyeither tolerated or actively encouraged by local authorities; in any case, it wasa predictable consequence of placing large numbers of police in tense circumstances,with neither the training nor the organization (not to mention to inclination)to respond with restraint.While the Escalated Force model did not always produce police riots, it alsodid practically nothing to reduce the odds that they would occur. In one sense, thepolice riot can be understood as the last step in the Escalated Force sequence.During the sixties, three additional problems with Escalated Force becameclear. First, the deployment of large numbers of cops often created a confrontationthat could have otherwise been avoided. Second, the rigid enforcement ofthe law and the quick recourse to force provoked crowds and sometimes led toviolence. And third, as a strategy for restoring order, Escalated Force failed.90'"t... .o.."0o-....(')oo'"t"0o-;:; .o'"to·..fI)·VREVISING THE THEORYFollowing the disasters of the late sixties, some people started to question thewisdom of a police strategy designed to "escalate" violence. Several commissions were set up to study the disturbances of the sixties, their causes, andthe police response to them. Most prominent among these were the Kerner,Eisenhower, and Scranton commissions. All three bodies concluded that policeactions against crowds often intensified, and in some cases provoked, civil disorder.They also recognized that the dangers of the Escalated Force model werenot only tactical, but political.The Scranton Commission wrote, "[Tj o respond to peaceful protest with repres-189
sion and brutal tactics is dangerously unwise. It makes extremists of moderates,deepens the divisions in the nation and increases the chances that future protestswill be violent."91Consequently, these boards recommended a number of changes in policehandling of demonstrations. The Kerner Commission, for instance, advocateda strategy emphasizing manpower over firepower, prevention over reaction,and increased management and regimentation of the police. A new strategy,"Negotiated Management," was born.Negotiated Management was designed to correct for the excesses of theEscalated Force model. Under the Negotiated Management approach,Police do not try to prevent demonstrations, but attempt to limit the amountof disruption they cause .... Police attempt to steer demonstrations to timesand places where disruption will be minimized .. .. Even civil disobedience,by definition illegal, is not usually problematic for police; they often cooperatewith protesters when their civil disobedience is intentionally symbolic.
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WITH A NEW INTRODUCTION BY•J O YJ
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(e) 2007 by Kristian WilliamsIntrod
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acknowledgmentsBOOKS DO Nar WRITE T
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ZSugE-
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forewordPOLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA
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1POLICE BRUTALITY IN THEORY AND PRA
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copter. Of these, ten Los Angeles P
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way of understanding the lives led
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vidual officer, perhaps it leads us
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given incident, while excessive use
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The difficulties in measuring exces
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up, a very large number of citizens
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(5) Unintentionality."[0 lffi cers
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Between 1995 and 2000, 360 cops wer
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emember that the available statisti
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even be supported by the lieutenant
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standing of those with power-those
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specialized function, and professio
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TIlere is a further advantage to th
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and frequently drunk.In 1727,Joseph
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the town, preparing elections, impr
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In fact, the first major reform of
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of personal honor. No White man sho
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stopping slaves whenever they were
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Charleston formed a City Guard in 1
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civil rather than military activity
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and Watch. This body was responsibl
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t::Uviolence, the committee argued,
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ity by policemen, dismissing thirte
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Political corruption was not new to
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3THE GENESIS OF A POLICED SOCIETYIN
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first moment, the importance of pol
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deals could be quite profitable for
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suppressing such riots. Not that th
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influence in wards where popular su
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delphia, investigated vegetable mar
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quo (that is, to protect the intere
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To the degree that industrializatio
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This analysis does not solve the pr
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well. 1I3 A more telling difference
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down. TIlls breakdown was in each c
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4COPS AND KLAN, HAND IN HANDAND THE
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tom .... A door opens outward on th
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very much like their previous statu
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tious driving, the model of the car
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statistics tell us that police arre
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fits the unit's established modus o
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Police investigators later document
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And let's not forget the enormous r
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area: they would pull up in a squad
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The Klan would meet the bus at the
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___ stoppedin terms of what the Fre
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SELMA, ALABAMA: BLOODY SUNDAYViolen
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point. The Panthers personified eve
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were killed, and ten other people w
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5THE NATURAL ENEMY OF THE WO RKING
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The practices surrounding the enfor
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lar officer's ties to the local com
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monopoly on it. Despite the continu
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troops, fifty cops from the Metropo
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and filled it with tear gas. As the
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Nine workers were arrested, charged
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the courts, and the police could be
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all health and well-being. The main
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ment retaliation, and a formal grie
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In 1912, Herman Rosenthal, a profes
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leadership. Increasingly, the polic
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struggle for status in urban Americ
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than before. But the main effect of
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The police also returned to open el
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policy. Henry Wise, the lawyer for
Page 155 and 156: the power and rewards of the upper
Page 157 and 158: found the FOP was sympathetic enoug
Page 159 and 160: whereas even the rookie patrolman s
Page 161 and 162: This process then results in a tran
Page 163 and 164: class. The police rebellion came wh
Page 165 and 166: is an obvious threat to democracy.T
Page 167 and 168: speeches, but as the evening wore o
Page 169 and 170: The Haymarket tragedy ... marked th
Page 171 and 172: 154The role of the red squads furth
Page 173 and 174: Democratic Convention, and later go
Page 175 and 176: tion. Bail would be set at astronom
Page 177 and 178: tapped, then admitted that it was b
Page 179 and 180: Department's Inspectional Service D
Page 181 and 182: dissenting group, representing rela
Page 183 and 184: instructions on infiltrating and di
Page 185 and 186: convention," was scheduled to coinc
Page 187 and 188: 170supposed to do that."1Z7 Another
Page 189 and 190: terrorism that covers virtually all
Page 191 and 192: In a typical case, Hady Hassan Omar
Page 193 and 194: a threat had already developed. The
Page 195 and 196: For most of that day, the police we
Page 197 and 198: the McCartby reportas a "crude and
Page 199 and 200: practical consequence of the Show o
Page 201 and 202: Such force took different forms. So
Page 203 and 204: at Rockefeller Center. Jeff Jones,
Page 205: On the tactical level, Stark notes:
Page 209 and 210: PLAYING BY THE RULESThe Negotiated
Page 211 and 212: f-;Cl.But the city council's perspe
Page 213 and 214: formalizes the strategy of violence
Page 215 and 216: Militarization ... can be defined i
Page 217 and 218: The nationwide craze for SWAT teams
Page 219 and 220: a--institution into believing that
Page 221 and 222: tiUCommon features seemed to connec
Page 223 and 224: are not difficult to discern. Mispl
Page 225 and 226: Community policing does not imply t
Page 227 and 228: .. Narcotics En forcement Area" sig
Page 229 and 230: one to the other) . lther than inve
Page 231 and 232: tubetter terms with the community o
Page 233 and 234: center . . .. I don't think there's
Page 235 and 236: urglaries"; "Biber, tell me about t
Page 237 and 238: Of course, many community policing
Page 239 and 240: in a long series of institutional s
Page 241 and 242: Rodney Stark writes, "It is vulgar
Page 243 and 244: the name of "gang suppression."I.1
Page 245 and 246: 228ed civil rights workers through
Page 247 and 248: the elderly and unemployed.40 Meanw
Page 249 and 250: these clumsy efforts. All this occu
Page 251 and 252: It is tempting to try to distinguis
Page 253 and 254: sion. Underlying the search for jus
Page 255 and 256: 0-'Ilr)[/)'"-l()et::01516[/) 17'"-l
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'"'i'..".,..-
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98 This grotesque overstatement ori
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140 \X'illiam Chambliss explains th
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-.0MIMMrn'"-10I¥0rn'"-1E-
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tr)"1"I.."1"rJ)00rJ)E-
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lI'1I0'"1'rJJCjg;(;:G0r...rJJb0Z18'
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252Chicago offering one of the few
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'-0l"-I..I"-rJJ>..
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..,..00I000
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o'"I0000rJlWc..?c.::o'""'rJlWf-;ozG
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2D Quoted in DonnC1", I'rotectors o
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00.-
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lr)N...INN...VJC)g;0VJE-03132333435
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00N'I
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U')
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274145 Braverman offers a clear des
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Dominance," 17.176 Smith concurs: "
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46 Ford Fessenden and Michael Moss,
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...t--...I00...c...CFJ00::0]:.l;.CF
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U"\..I
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1 Eugene L Leach, "The Litcratllre
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M'"""I0000,...(fJ00::0'""(fJ1-
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00N100a--,...(J)C)0>0-(J)E-
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(:ommunity Policing," in Victor E.
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the United Statf>" (Pittsburgh: Uni
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I'- ..NI"
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1'5olire (Berkeley, CA: Center for
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and oppressed people suffer. The Pa
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70 J\kl:voy and Mik,l, "Republican
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selected bibliographyI HAVE TRIED T
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This is the most readable of the hi
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INSTITUTIONALIZED BRUTALITY AND POL
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Six Sociological Essays, edited by
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Smith, Bruce. Police Systems in the
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CHAPTER 7: SECRET POLICE, RED SQUAD
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This collection features studies of
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Policing Consortium. NCJ 148457. Au
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Mika, Harry and Kieran McEvoy. "Res
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Andrews, Avery D., 288n.4Anthracite
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...>< California Supreme Court, 291
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Constables of the Commonwealth(Mass
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Ettor, Joseph, 112-113Everett cotto
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homelessness and vagrancy (cont.)Se
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...X "Letter from Harlem." See "Fif
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National Commission on the Causesan
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:>< Pennsylvania State Federation o
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prostitution (ca nt.)See also broke
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X Scranton Commission (President's
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:>< Ta mmany Hall, 51, 52, 55, 250n
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Weisburd, David, 243n.137Weiss, The
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Even critics have a difficult time
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