Natural Resources and Violent Conflict - WaterWiki.net

136 crossin, hayman, and taylorsmugglers tend to concentrate on supplying rhesus monkeys to the lucrativelaboratory market by laundering wild-caught animals throughcaptive-breeding facilities.Considerations 2 and 3: Market Forces That DriveEnterprise CrimeEvasion of CTR controls is known as enterprise crime. Traditional lawenforcement bureaucracies have been set up to tackle traditional predatorycrime, which involves the involuntary redistribution of wealththrough theft and robbery. In contrast, enterprise crimes are structuredaround consensual and mutually beneficial exchanges among producers,processors, retailers, and final consumers where supply and demandfor services interact in a free-market relationship. Because thereis no obvious victim to report a crime, the authorities are required totake a lead in investigating and prosecuting such offenses. If theft is involved,it is more often theft from the state than theft from an individual.Society as a whole is victimized—although the individuals tradingin conflict diamonds may gain from their transactions, those commoditiesare funding belligerents. Trade in conflict timber not onlyfunds national or regional destabilization but also damages the globalenvironment.The traditional “head-hunting” approach adopted by law enforcementagencies to tackle predatory crime does little to address the pressuresof supply and demand that shape profit-making opportunities.Society as a whole is often unaware of its victimization, so regulatorsmay not set appropriate levels of enforcement effort and restitution;regulatory institutions may even assume that because many problemsrelated to enterprise crime are not directly quantifiable, they are notsignificant.Indeed, commodity control regimes themselves may inadvertentlycreate incentives for evasion of regulations by artificially altering supplyand demand. Supply may be constrained to conserve a scarce environmentalgood such as an endangered animal population or becauseof the increased costs of complying with altered environmental regulations.Similarly, demand may be adjusted through policies like taxationto compensate for an associated cost or externality related to theproduction or consumption of particular commodities. Avoidance ofthese “restrictions” may bring significant profits.In the case of the Montreal protocol, a lack of consideration ofmarket forces and different phase-out schedules for ozone-depletingsubstances between the developed and developing world generated asignificant black market. Although direct supply restrictions were put