Natural Resources and Violent Conflict - WaterWiki.net

246 philippe le billon• Importing and exporting authority (or authorities) nominated byeach participant and in charge of, respectively, issuing certificates andverifying their validity• Independent auditors charged with helping government authoritiesto verify systems of warranties put in place by individual companies• Review missions, which require the consent of concerned participantsas to composition and conduct (in “an analytical, expert, andimpartial manner”)• Observers, representatives of civil society, the diamond industry,international organizations, and nonparticipating governments, whoare invited to take part in plenary meetings.The participation criteria, as well as compliance and enforcementmechanisms, are weak and formulated on a voluntary basis. Reviewmissions on compliance are to be conducted “with the consent of theParticipant concerned and in consultation with all Participants.”When an issue regarding compliance arises, “any concerned Participantmay so inform the Chair, who is to inform all Participants withoutdelay about the said concern and enter into dialogue on how toaddress it. Participants and Observers should make every effort toobserve strict confidentiality regarding the issue and the discussionsrelating to any compliance matter.” Finally, there is no explicit mentionof an exclusion procedure for noncomplying participants.The Kimberley scheme is complemented by self-regulatory measureson the part of the industry. As declared by the World DiamondCouncil’s chairman, “The self-regulation ...is vital . . . and the industryis committed to fulfilling its obligation in step with governments.Individuals or companies that fail to observe the new rules will pay ahigh price for that failure.” 29 Critics point out that such declarationshave not so far left anyone “paying a high price” in the industry, atleast publicly, and self-regulation cannot be trusted. The scheme is alsocomplemented by national legislation.The Kimberley process was concluded in November 2002 and wasto become effective on January 1, 2003, but this deadline had not beenmet at the time of writing. There is no means of asserting its effectivenessapart from the pilot certification projects conducted since 2001 inSierra Leone and, to some extent, in Angola. In both cases, the projectsdid not completely stop the smuggling of diamonds, and, what is moreimportant, their impact on the conflict could not be assessed givenother external factors, such as military intervention and peacekeepingdeployment. The Kimberley scheme came into effect after the conflictsin Angola and Sierra Leone had been officially declared over—largelydue to military interventions—and the conflict in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo may be winding down. This does not mean that the