Natural Resources and Violent Conflict - WaterWiki.net

getting it done 239Many observers argued that the sanctions regime was not only ineffectivebut also counterproductive in humanitarian terms, with a vastamount of smuggling in both arms and commodities taking place, whilehumanitarian and development aid was impeded (Haq 1997).In contrast to many unilateral sanctions imposed by a “distant”power attempting to control imports into its markets, regional sanctionsmay have been more capable of impeding conflict trade by interveningin both transport links and the exploitation of commodities.This intervention, however, may create significant vulnerability, asmajor local interests often can undermine the design and effective implementationof sanctions. Furthermore, the enforcement capacity ofneighboring countries can be weak, especially when dealing with easilyconcealable commodities such as diamonds or gold.Judicial InstrumentsThe judicial prosecution of sanctions busters and of resource companiesand traders engaging with belligerents is in its infancy, both interms of permanent international legislation—rather than ad hoc oneslike UN resolutions—and in terms of institutions with international jurisdiction.The judicial prosecution of UN sanctions is also in a fledglingstage. As mentioned in the discussion of UN sanctions, many memberstates have failed to criminalize sanctions busting, and even fewer haveacted on such legislation. So far there has been no arrest on charges ofcommodity sanctions busting, and only two individuals—one of themalso a primary commodity trader—have faced charges for violating aUN arms embargo. In terms of judicial enforcement, national legislationand institutions remain key instruments of enforcement.National Legislation. Although this chapter focuses on internationalinstruments, national-level judicial instruments are highly relevant,starting with the implementation of legislation flowing from theimposition of UN sanctions. National-level instruments are used totarget a wide range of “classic” criminal activities (such as moneylaundering) and other activities relevant to conflict trade (such as complicityin human rights abuses). This section examines two ways inwhich national-level enforcement instruments have been employed: totarget rogue traders and to target multinational companies.Since many national-level instruments are being applied in the contextof armed conflicts, they constitute a potential instrument of enforcement.In general, though, these instruments have been deployed as ameans of advocacy, redress, and deterrence rather than as a mechanismof enforcement to curtail conflict trade per se.