Natural Resources and Violent Conflict - WaterWiki.net

220 philippe le billonThere is, however, an advantage to tackling otherwise legal trade andcommodities. By increasing the risks of sanctions without increasingprices, regulation is likely to reduce the commercial viability of conflicttrade. For example, interdiction policies on narcotics have largely failedto curb revenues, crime, and their impact on conflicts. Yet this failurehas come precisely from the global nature of interdiction policies, inparticular in importing countries. In a sector where all the supply isillegal, but demand is high and enforcement difficult, prices and profitsare likely to rise. Unlike with narcotics, legal producers and importersshape the international price of otherwise licit natural resources.This points to a potential advantage of enforcement instruments aimedat controlling conflict trade, in that criminalizing specific supplierswithin a broader market is less likely to inflate prices and thus toincrease the profitability of illegal supply. This conjecture is, however,general in nature; agencies considering the application of enforcementinstruments should take into account possible counterproductiveresults, particularly in terms of prices, profitability, and attractivenessfor belligerents and criminal networks.Institutional Structure of Enforcement InstrumentsAbroad range of instruments is relevant to conflict trade, with a varietyof goals, targets, means, and scale of application. The most relevantones have been specifically designed as international legal instruments,such as United Nations (UN) Security Council economic sanctions, butmany others have been developed to address broader environmentaland social issues or to respond to threats posed by transnational organizedcrime and international terrorism. States remain the most importantactor in terms of legislation and enforcement. Yet intergovernmentalorganizations, private businesses, and civil society groups haveplayed an increasing role in shaping a new generation of instrumentsand policies defining ethical norms and mixing voluntary compliance,market-based incentives, and independent monitoring. Given the blurringof boundaries in design and implementation, governance modelsfor enforcement instruments to control the flow of natural resourcesare increasingly diverse. For example, nongovernmental organizationsare now participating more in the design of mandatory instruments ledby governments, while governments are participating in industryself-regulation schemes. Overall, however, these initiatives have beendeveloped largely in response to pressure from civil society and advocacygroups.