Natural Resources and Violent Conflict - WaterWiki.net

276 philippe le billonlevels hinder effective enforcement (for example, absence or poorcommunication of both intelligence and public information, bureaucraticred tape, lack of financial resources, slow judicial procedures,and vested political interests).• Uneven jurisdiction at the international level creates major loopholes(for example, offshore banking and incorporation).Even if well implemented, international instruments of enforcementare unlikely to halt the mobilization of natural resources in armed conflicts.Nonetheless, by raising the production and transaction costsof belligerents and their accomplices, such instruments may be ableto drastically reduce the trade in otherwise legal “conflict resources.”Raising transaction costs for belligerents and their accomplices can onlyresult from effective enforcement—even if simply by dissuading mostpotential buyers. Furthermore, production and transaction costs need tobe sufficiently high to reflect the significant discounts that belligerentsare often willing to make. Moreover, although profit making has beenrecently stressed as one of the motivations of belligerents, this is notalways the case. Politically motivated belligerents will find ways toadapt their struggle to the difficult economic conditions resulting fromeffective enforcement measures. Belligerents are likely to accept noneconomicdeals simply to increase their cash flow in the short term toachieve their goals. Raised costs must also reflect the low cost of appropriationor production by belligerents. Profit-motivated belligerentscontrolling or exploiting resources at significant discounts in comparisonto normal authorities or businesses (for example, through theft, useof forced labor, or disregard for environmental standards or sustainabilityprinciples) are likely to accept significantly discounted buying prices.Addressing these enforcement issues is complicated in the context offragmented governance in which the designated enforcement agencyand the most effective enforcement mechanism (self, soft, or hard) aredifficult to identify. Moreover, little expertise exists to enable an evaluationof the effectiveness of enforcement instruments. Effectiveness canbe assessed, for example, on the basis of the following:• The priority and visibility of the policy agenda in internationalmeetings or the media, but this does not guarantee effectiveness• Expert knowledge within the industry or monitoringorganizations• The number of individuals arrested or “named and shamed” or theamount of resources and financial revenues seized, yet the impact on therest of the trade and the course of the conflict may be difficult to assess• The termination of the conflict itself, although many otherfactors frequently intervene.