19.06.2022 Views

Dominican Republic and Haiti: Country Studies

by Helen Chapin Metz et al

by Helen Chapin Metz et al

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

<strong>Haiti</strong>: National Security<br />

vented the implementation of these changes. The army feared<br />

that a separate police would compete for funds <strong>and</strong> influence<br />

<strong>and</strong> would threaten its opportunities for profit. The armed<br />

forces continued to act as the nation's ultimate law enforcement<br />

agency in spite of their lack of competence in this area.<br />

The only identifiable police force in <strong>Haiti</strong> operated in Port-au-<br />

Prince, its members assigned to it by the armed forces. This<br />

1,000-member force had few operational or technical capabilities,<br />

even though it was responsible for criminal investigations,<br />

as well as narcotics <strong>and</strong> immigration control. Members of the<br />

FAd'H detailed for police duties received no specific training in<br />

police methods. They did not have regular beats, investigate<br />

crimes, or carry out other normal police functions. The police<br />

could be hired to arrest persons on flimsy evidence. Warrantless<br />

arrest was common, as was incommunicado detention.<br />

There was no true rural police. Small garrisons, operating<br />

under military department comm<strong>and</strong>, with some cooperation<br />

from the lowest central government administrative heads, the<br />

military section chiefs, were responsible for rural security. In<br />

effect, the 562 section chiefs functioned not only as police<br />

chiefs but also as primary government representatives in rural<br />

areas. Thus, with little or no oversight from the capital <strong>and</strong><br />

without special training, the officers assigned to keep order<br />

often acted as prosecutors, judges, <strong>and</strong> tax assessors in a brutal<br />

system whose main purpose was to prevent any grassroots<br />

opposition from developing.<br />

In addition to its failure to establish a nationwide police<br />

force as called for in the constitution, the military leadership<br />

failed to subdue the VSN <strong>and</strong> other vigilante groups. Direct<br />

links between the senior army comm<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> remnants of the<br />

VSN enabled many VSN agents to infiltrate FAd'H units <strong>and</strong><br />

the cadres of the Port-au-Prince police force. Many of the paramilitary<br />

groups simply were engaged in a career of b<strong>and</strong>itry<br />

with no political motivation. The Avril government made some<br />

effort to crack down on abuses in the internal security services,<br />

but members of the FAd'H <strong>and</strong> its various affiliates continued<br />

to use their monopoly of power to subjugate <strong>and</strong> mistreat the<br />

<strong>Haiti</strong>an citizenry. It has been estimated that some 3,000 <strong>Haiti</strong>ans<br />

died in the 1991-94 period as a result of the FAd'H's<br />

oppressive governance.<br />

<strong>Haiti</strong>'s External <strong>and</strong> Domestic Security Concerns<br />

Defense of the nation against external threats was never a<br />

473

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!