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Zwischen Arktis Adria und Armenien

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220 Sovieto-Rossica<br />

with the eye of the high-flying eagle”, thus states a textbook published in 1997 in<br />

Tiraspol’, “Transnistria – this thin strip of land along the grey-haired river Dniester –<br />

resembles a Skythian arc.” 25 With reference to Aleksandr A. Blok’s famous poem<br />

“The Skythians” (Skify), TMR identity management portrays Transnistria as a Slavic<br />

bullwark at the crossroads of Europe and Asia. For example, a map on the TMR’s<br />

geopolitical position in the official English-language Atlas of the Dniester Moldavian<br />

Republic represents the territory of the TMR as being much more compact than<br />

the geodetic facts suggest, as well as being located in a geopolitically crucial central<br />

position between East and West. In doing so, this alleged ‘centrality’ of the TMR<br />

relates to two constellations: First, the TMR is portrayed as being located right in the<br />

middle between the ‘brotherly states’ of Belarus’ and the Russian Federation on the<br />

one side and the equally ‘brotherly’ – since Christian-Orthodox – Balkan countries<br />

of Bulgaria, Macedonia and Serbia on the other. Second, it is depicted as being encircled<br />

by the hostile NATO members Poland, Hungary, Greece and Turkey. 26 Moldova,<br />

which according to TMR propaganda is a hotbed of “Chişinău-style Nazism” and a<br />

stomping gro<strong>und</strong> of “Romanian cannibals”, 27 as well as the Ukraine – in Tiraspol’s<br />

perception notoriously unreliable with regard to Christian-Orthodox and eastern Slav<br />

solidarity 28 – are perceived as two blocs of the same anti-Russian vice. However, in<br />

the perception of the TMR leadership Transnistria is of primary geostrategic importance<br />

for Moscow. In this context, the Kaliningrad parallel is frequently invoked by<br />

TMR officials, and this not only in military terms but also in terms of international<br />

status: The TMR – thus the message – should be turned into a second Kaliningrad<br />

Oblast’, i. e. it should become a subject of the Russian Federation. The self-stylization<br />

of the TMR as “a tiny bit of the Great Russian state”, as described by Smirnov<br />

25 N. V. Babilunga and B. G. Bomeško, Stranicy rodnoj istorii. Učebnoe posobie po istorii dlj 5 klassa<br />

srednej školy (Tiraspol’, 1997), inside cover. For the context, see also Stefan Troebst, “Wie ein<br />

skythischer Bogen. Transnistrien als slawisches Bollwerk zwischen dem Orient <strong>und</strong> Europa”, Frankfurter<br />

Allgemeine Zeitung, 7 October 2002, 8, and on mental mapping in Eastern Europe in general,<br />

Id., “‘Intermarium’ <strong>und</strong> ‘Vermählung mit dem Meer’: Kognitive Karten <strong>und</strong> Geschichtspolitik in Ostmitteleuropa”,<br />

28(3) Geschichte <strong>und</strong> Gesellschaft (2002), 435–469.<br />

26 See the map “Geopolitical Position” in Dniester Moldavian Republic (ed.), Atlas . . . , 7.<br />

27 For the term kišinevskij nacizm see Volkova, Lider, Introduction, and for the slander rumynskie ljudoedy<br />

a photograph dated June 1992 showing Transnistrian volunteers on a truck whose tailboard<br />

carries the graffiti “Death to the Romanian cannibals!” (Smert’ rumynskim liudoedam!) in a brochure<br />

by Valerij Kruglikov and N. Vorob’eva, Bendery. Leto-92. Vojina (Fotoal’bom) (Bendery, 1995), 40.<br />

28 The TMR’s relationship with the neighboring Ukraine is ambivalent: On the one hand, in 1995<br />

TMR diplomacy succeeded in securing Kiev’s participation as a co-mediator in the conflict between<br />

Tiraspol’ and Chişinău – along with the Russian Federation and the OSCE – and in having Ukrainian<br />

blue helmet troops deployed in order to safeguard, together with Russian, Moldovan and Transnistrian<br />

troops, the Security Zone established after the armed clash over Bendery in July 1992 along<br />

the Dniester. On the other hand, Smirnov’s personal relationship to the eastern neighbor has been<br />

seriously strained by the fact that in September 1991 he was kidnapped in Kiev by the Moldovan<br />

secret service and brought to Chişinău – with the knowledge and obviously also the consent of the<br />

Ukrainian authorities. After several weeks in jail he was released. See Volkova, Lider, chapter V.

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