Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

Facing The JaPanese OnslaughT 1941–42
What Fletcher did not know was that SWPA’s air reconnaissance forces were not aware
of the location of the Allied surface forces nor, according to some reports, that a major
naval engagement was in progress in the Coral Sea. This was to have unfortunate
consequences for TG 17.3 in the immediate future. A further significant fact Crace was
unaware of was that his force had been detected by a Japanese flying boat shortly after
detachment from TF 17, and been reported as comprising two battleships, two cruisers
and destroyers. To Admiral Inoue this represented the major threat to his Occupation
Force: he ordered his transports to reverse course at 0900 and directed the 25th Air
Flotilla to destroy TF 17.3. 231
Crace was not well provided with organic intelligence resources. He had no air cover,
but he did have the amphibian assets of his own force for scouting. He decided not to
use these, as the necessary launching and recovery operations may have endangered
his own ships. Crace’s reluctance to launch his aircraft is interesting in the light of his
great uncertainty about the exact whereabouts of the Japanese. Although not aware his
force had been detected, he knew he was being shadowed and observed from about
1130. A possible explanation can be found in War Orders for HMA Squadron, which
stated: ‘Unless the recovery of cruiser borne aircraft undamaged is reasonably assured
they should not be employed on searches and patrols’. He also had radar in Chicago
and HMAS Hobart but this was useful only for detecting aircraft, and the war diaries
for Coral Sea indicate that it served this purpose admirably. 232 His force was equipped
with HFDF and intercept equipment, and the latter was used to monitor the progress
of operations by the air wings of the US carriers.
Crace thus had a broadly accurate idea of his enemy (except for Takagi’s carriers),
its location and its intentions, but he had little detailed information on the present
whereabouts of his target. He had no personal experience of fighting the Japanese —
Hobart was the only ABDA veteran present — and there was little doctrine to guide his
appreciation of how his IJN opponent might approach the problem of forcing Jomard
Passage. He was very aware that the threat to his force and its mission would come
from the air. He was not well informed on the position of his CTF, nor of the progress
of the fighting which was taking place between the carriers. 233 He did not expect any
but indirect support from Allied Air Forces, which assessment was quite correct.
Post-action analysis indicated that Allied Air Forces had difficulty finding the aircraft
to conduct the reconnaissance and strike missions ordered: only 80 per cent of the
reconnaissance sorties produced any result, and only 50 per cent of the ordered strikes
took place. 234
Map 5 is a track chart of the battle, based on the map in Gill’s Royal Australian Navy,
1942—1945, showing Allied and Japanese dispositions and movements. The role of
TG 17.3 in the Battle of the Coral Sea is usually relegated to sideshow status, and this
is understandable, given the stakes riding on the carrier versus carrier battle about
to be joined. The action part of the story is quickly told.
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