Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

358 Missing Pieces
Final Observations and conclusions
847 NAA A8447 — COSC Minutes, Minute 31/1970 of 6 May 1970.
848 Unlike the USN, which steadily developed its combat intelligence capabilities and organic
intelligence collection materials, especially after Korea, the RAN has never had an intelligence
branch in its permanent officer corps. In this it was also different from the Australian
Army and the RAAF. It was not until the late 1970s that significant efforts and progress
were made to enhance collection capabilities, and to organise the personnel and support
organisations required for intelligence collection and tactical support in a modern maritime
environment.
849 As has also been argued in the book, misidentification by IJN aircraft of Allied ships,
especially their propensity for seeing battleships in the SWPA where there were none, had
catastrophic operational and strategic consequences for that navy as well.
850 Training of RAN personnel for ASW duties with the RN, and the commissioning of a whole
class of destroyers in the United Kingdom manned by RAN crews, were two enduring
manifestations of these early decisions. In 1942, at the most serious stage of the Japanese
advance, nearly 10 per cent of the RAN’s personnel were serving with the RN.
851 Arguably, Sigint made a greater contribution, but it is not clear that even US commanders
in the field invariably received this in time. If paraphrase of Sigint was necessary
because of security concerns, then ‘Coastwatchers’ provided an acceptable source for the
information.
852 Faced with a similar but larger and more-pressing problem, the First Sea Lord at the Admiralty
created the position of Flag Officer Western Approaches to coordinate the defence of Atlantic
convoys. The Australian CNS would, of course, have been aware of this development, but he
may simply not have had an officer of the required calibre to assume this role, given other
pressing demands.
853 The counter-argument is that the strength and determination of the UN ASW effort acted
as a deterrent to Soviet and Chinese intentions.
854 ‘The training of competent intelligence officers is one of the first tasks confronting
Intelligence. These officers should be thoroughly grounded in naval science, familiar
with all intelligence sources, thoroughly versed in the capabilities of potential enemies,
indoctrinated in the conflicting demands of security and dissemination and, in the higher
echelons, competent to direct collection and ingradation. [sic] of intelligence material. The
experience gained by intelligence officers in the field should be the basis of their training.
For a very few, intelligence should be a lifetime career’. [Jasper Holmes, ‘Narrative Combat
Intelligence Center, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area’ , RH Spector (ed), in
Listening to the Enemy: Key Documents on the Role of Communications Intelligence in the War
with Japan, Scholarly Resources, Wilmington, Del., 1988, pp.154—169.] Captain Holmes
experienced the struggles of the USN to create an organisation to support the intelligence
demands of the Pacific Fleet in WWII. These, his narrative’s concluding remarks, have wide
applicability.
855 Although the RAN was keen to find a role for HMAS Melbourne in Vietnam, the 7th Fleet
had no use for a carrier with such limited offensive capability, and the ASW threat was low.
[Grey, Up Top, pp. 78—80.] Patrol craft would have been very useful to both USN and RAN
but were not then in the RAN order of battle.