Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
64 The chart of the reconstruction included at Figure 2.2 is from NAA B6121/3, Item 211E —
Romolo sinking of by HMAS Manoora.
65 This calculation is based on chart 120 in Gill, RAN, 1939—1942.
66 Burrell recorded that, ‘Spurgeon did extraordinarily well under the circumstances, no thanks
to our calling the dog from the rabbit’. [Burrell, Mermaids Do Exist, p. 81.]
67 Most of the Navy’s warships were in the Mediterranean or the Indian Ocean engaged in
higher priority tasks of escorting troop transports. [Gill, RAN, 1939—1942, pp. 117-118.]
68 There was even discussion by the British chiefs of staff of abandoning the Mediterranean,
but Churchill vetoed the idea. [Barnett, Engage the Enemy, pp. 209—213.]
69 The intelligence coup that allowed the British to inspect an Italian cruiser is described by
Joseph Maiolo, ‘I believe the Hun is cheating’: British Admiralty Technical Intelligence and
the German Navy, 1936—39’, Intelligence and National Security 11, 1996, pp. 32—58.
70 Traffic analysis is the derivation from intelligence from an intercepted message before it
is subjected to cryptanalysis. Information could be extracted from the time and direction
of the signal’s arrival, the frequency used, callsigns associated with it, its form, length or
coding system applied, and the identification of the originating operator or transmitter.
71 At the outbreak of war the Mediterranean Fleet had been powerful, highly trained and
well balanced. Its ships began to be withdrawn to other areas almost immediately and the
replacements were often old and incapable of participating in modern fleet actions. [Andre
Cunningham, A Sailor’s Odyssey, Hutchinson, London, 1952, pp. 218 & 234.]
72 John Collins, As Luck Would Have It: The Reminiscences of an Australian Sailor, Angus &
Robertson, Sydney, 1965, p.84.
73 Collins, As Luck Would Have It, pp. 82—83.
74 NAA MP1185/8, Item 2026/3/351 — Action off Cape Spada 19/07/40—Bartolomeo Colleoni,
HMAS Sydney letter 8234/40 of 30 July 1940.
75 Collins was not the only one counting on Italian routine operations. In his account of the
battle, the Italian commander, Vice Admiral Casardi, stated that: ‘I had not catapulted any of
our aircraft because I was certain that Egomil (Italian HQ at Rhodes) would by that time have
assured reconnaissance over the sea areas which the Division had to cross’. [NAA B6121/3,
Item 56D — HMAS Sydney in Bartolomeo Colleoni action, Casardi reference N.279/SRP of 23
July 1940.] Casardi was, however, also concerned about the possibility of British submarines
in the area, which should surely have prompted an ASW sweep by his floatplanes along the
cruisers’ intended track.
76 Jack Greene, & Alessandro Massignani, The Naval War in the Mediterranean 1940—1943,
Chatham Publishing, London, 1998, p.82.
77 On the force’s return to Alexandria, Cunningham asked Collins how he had got into a firing
position so soon. Collins replied: ‘Providence guided me, Sir’. Cunningham responded with:
‘Well, in future you can continue to take your orders from Providence’. [Collins, As Luck
Would Have It, p. 88.]
78 Collins, As Luck Would Have It, p. 85.
79 UKNA ADM1/1117 8— HMAS Sydney Sinking of Bartolomeo Colleoni, letter Med.0901/0710/30/2
of 21 Sep 1940.
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