06.04.2013 Views

Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.

92 <strong>Missing</strong> <strong>Pieces</strong><br />

the island in an effort to forestall the Japanese from taking advantage of Portuguese<br />

neutrality. The Portuguese did not resist the Allies, but neither was their support<br />

total. Between September 1941 and the Japanese attack, the British Government had<br />

originated the plan, convinced the Dutch and <strong>Australian</strong> Governments to participate<br />

— there were no British forces involved — and then disowned the idea as it became<br />

aware of the outrage felt by the Portuguese at the proposal. 276 The plan surprised the<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> consul in Dili, Mr. David Ross — an NID officer serving with Department of<br />

External Affairs — but he had a significant role in its execution.<br />

The Allies did not really believe that these relatively small forces could prevent<br />

a Japanese landing, but they did hope to provide sufficient resistance to slow the<br />

Japanese advance through the Malay Barrier. The topography of Portuguese (East)<br />

Timor promised opportunities for this kind of warfare. In due course the Japanese did<br />

invade Timor, on the night of 19 February 1942, landing at both Dili, the Portuguese<br />

capital, and Kupang, and their troops and naval gunfire support quickly routed the<br />

token Allied forces opposing them. The remnants of the Allied regular troops retreated<br />

into the hinterland, where elements joined up with 2/2 Independent Company, while<br />

the Japanese, needing their shock troops for further assaults in NEI, quickly reduced<br />

their force levels to little more than garrisons.<br />

Lack of communications with Australia prevented news of the situation in Timor being<br />

conveyed to Allied authorities — GHQ had assumed that all resistance in Timor had<br />

been overcome. However, this was corrected by amazing feats of self-reliance on the<br />

part of the Independent Company, which managed to re-establish radio contact with<br />

Australia on 20 April. Allied planners now realised that by supporting the soldiers<br />

in East Timor they could achieve the aims of collecting intelligence on the Japanese,<br />

directing bombing raids on the Japanese garrisons, and tying down the IJA. Accordingly,<br />

GHQ SWPA issued orders on 19 June 1942 that the force on Timor was to be supported<br />

until compelled to withdraw. 277 A system for re-equipment and resupply of the force,<br />

plus the introduction of fresh troops and the evacuation of the sick, wounded and some<br />

Portuguese citizens, was put in place, with the RAN responsible for most of the work.<br />

Commanding the operation of these supply missions was the Naval Officer-in-Charge<br />

(NOIC) Darwin, in late 1942 Commodore Cuthbert Pope, RN.<br />

The means available were severely limited: Timor did not have a high priority, and<br />

ships and aircraft suitable for the resupply missions were few. In time, 2/2 Independent<br />

Company was being served by a combination of Catalina flights, stores drops by<br />

Hudsons and landings and extractions by RAN ships. None of these was totally safe<br />

from interdiction. The IJA maintained a fighter squadron at Dili, which was used not<br />

only to attack the Allied positions but could and did intercept RAAF and USAAF supply<br />

and bombing missions, and they had bombers based in the Moluccas to attack both<br />

Sparrow Force and cooperating ships. The Japanese also flew regular surveillance

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!