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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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aPPendix<br />

practices and personnel, bringing to the new organisation many of the strains that<br />

marked the struggle between the US Army and the USN for primacy over intelligence.<br />

However, the majority of the changes were both positive and necessary, as the United<br />

States brought to the war in the South West Pacific its greater personnel and technical<br />

resources, particularly those required to exploit Sigint.<br />

Some of the pre-MacArthur agencies were swallowed up or transformed, others worked<br />

in collaboration with GHQ SWPA. The development of new skills and the emergence<br />

of new requirements bred new agencies, but others continued virtually unchanged,<br />

regardless of MacArthur. For many, the British influence on their operations remained<br />

strong, while for others, such as the NID, residual responsibilities to the Imperial<br />

organisation remained. The result was an interesting, and sometimes confusing,<br />

patchwork of intelligence agencies, all competing for money, manpower and materiel.<br />

A diagram of the organisation prepared by the author is at Figure 12.<br />

naval intelligence<br />

The USN intelligence staff attached to the CANF/C7F headquarters was responsible<br />

for supporting not only their commander but also forces under his command. It was<br />

set up in 1942 as the USN Intelligence Section, but in 1943 Commander (later Captain)<br />

McCollum, USN, reshaped it as 7th Fleet Intelligence Center, and as a replica of the<br />

Joint Intelligence Center in Pearl Harbor. This was separate from GHQ SWPA, and took<br />

its intelligence from naval sources as well as from GHQ COIC, Allied Air Forces and<br />

from Central Bureau. 869 All task force and task group commanders received the bulk of<br />

their intelligence from the centre, except for that provided from local sources. CSWPSF<br />

was responsible for distributing intelligence to NOICs, who had the responsibility of<br />

providing intelligence support to ships under their command.<br />

FRUMEL passed product directly to the two US submarine commanders in Australia<br />

and also provided the nucleus of a number of mobile radio intelligence units that were<br />

posted to 7th Fleet ships.<br />

central Bureau<br />

Shortly after his assumption of command, General MacArthur’s authorised the<br />

establishment of a new Sigint organisation that would be directly subordinated to<br />

GHQ SWPA. The outcome was the Central Bureau, formed round a nucleus of<br />

experienced US and <strong>Australian</strong> officers and using, initially, the services of the<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> Army and RAAF special wireless units. 870 Its tasks were coordination and<br />

operational control of the theatre’s Sigint activities (but not those of FRUMEL or the<br />

RAN), cryptanalysis, traffic analysis and DF. As a true Allied operation, CB was not<br />

275

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