Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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Figure 2 - Desirable Intelligence for Naval Operations inTROducTiOn 5
6 <strong>Missing</strong> <strong>Pieces</strong> aircraft at the Battle of Midway that were precipitated by incorrect and inadequate information on the composition of the USN force sighted by a Japanese scout plane. 8 For this reason, denial or concealment of his force’s composition to an opponent is of critical interest to any commander: operational deception is the art of injecting false information into the enemy’s appreciations. Understanding the enemy’s aims and objectives will facilitate good decision making. In both World Wars the British understood that the successful re-routing of convoys was crucial in frustrating the German aim of destroying Britain’s supply lines across the Atlantic. Sinking U-boats was an important but secondary issue. 9 Conversely, for a long period of the war in the Pacific, US submarine efforts were directed against Japanese warships, while Japan’s military conquests were only the means to its war aim of ensuring access to supplies of industrial materials. The US shift to targeting Japanese commercial shipping in late 1943 directly attacked that aim. 10 Significant intelligence effort is expended in determining how effectively an enemy force can resist attacks and deliver counterattacks. Knowledge of the capability of enemy weapons and systems provides information on weapon engagement and effectiveness ranges, and allows the development of physical or tactical countermeasures to reduce that effectiveness. In peacetime, covert or overt observation is the most likely source of intelligence, while in wartime it is likely to come from exploitation of captured or recovered documents and equipment. Similarly, knowledge of enemy tactics enables opposing naval forces to refine their operational doctrine. Once proven to be effective, standardised tactics are taught and practised to improve the capability of ships and aircraft to participate effectively in operations. Clearly, the opportunity of observing an enemy’s tactics most often arises when one is on the receiving end of them, although assumptions made in the heat of battle may be erroneous until further researched. In the early days of the Pacific War many Allied ship losses in action were attributed to mine strikes. The actual cause was the Japanese ‘Long Lance’ torpedo, of which the Allies knew nothing. Shortages of fuel, ammunition or damage to ship systems will inhibit a commander’s freedom of action. In May 1941, the German battleship Bismarck successfully engaged elements of the British Home Fleet, evaded detection by reconnaissance forces and would probably have broken out into the Atlantic were it not for relatively minor battle damage to her forward hull. This caused a reduction in speed and a loss of fuel, which prompted her commander to seek repairs in occupied France. She thus re-entered the area being searched by the British, was subsequently torpedoed aft and lost steering, making her an easy target for the pursuing British heavy forces. 11 Knowledge of the opposition’s weapon and fuel state and any hindrance to anticipated enemy actions can shape an operational plan. However, this information is not always easily ascertained and signals intelligence (Sigint) or a breach of enemy security is usually the source of it.
Page 1 and 2: Papers in Australian Maritime Affai
Page 3 and 4: © Copyright Commonwealth of Austra
Page 5 and 6: disclaimer The views expressed are
Page 7 and 8: vi No. 13 Future Environmental Poli
Page 9 and 10: viii instinct ensured that even fau
Page 11 and 12: x Missing Pieces 4. Taking the Offe
Page 13 and 14: xii Maps 1. Pursuit of MV Romolo by
Page 15 and 16: xiv glossary In this book, place na
Page 17 and 18: xvi Missing Pieces CCS Combined Chi
Page 19 and 20: xviii Missing Pieces NGS Naval Gunf
Page 22 and 23: introduction By ‘intelligence’
Page 24 and 25: inTROducTiOn commander’s requirem
Page 28 and 29: inTROducTiOn Sigint involves the in
Page 30 and 31: inTROducTiOn In her study of the ca
Page 32 and 33: 1. setting the scene - The Ran and
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Page 48 and 49: OPeRaTiOns againsT iTaly, Vichy FRa
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Page 72 and 73: Facing The JaPanese OnslaughT 1941-
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Facing The JaPanese OnslaughT 1941-
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4. Taking the Offensive, 1942—45
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Map 9
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 treate
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 across
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The bridge of HMAS Australia Taking
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 guns.
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Barbey
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5. a united nations ‘Police actio
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6. securing southeast asia: Malayan
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secuRing sOuTheasT asia: Malayan eM
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7. Propping up a domino: Vietnam, 1
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PROPPing uP a dOMinO: VieTnaM 1967-
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Map 26 - Operation MARKET TIME PROP
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Damage received by HMAS Hobart afte
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8. Final Observations and conclusio
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OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns Bureau
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OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns up the
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OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns level
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codebreaking appendix - australian
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aPPendix practices and personnel, b
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aPPendix in the chain of command of
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aPPendix units’ in RAAF terminolo
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archival Records national archives
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CO1022 South East Asia Department:
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BiBliOgRaPhy Clausewitz, Karl von,
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BiBliOgRaPhy Harper, Norman, A Grea
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BiBliOgRaPhy Maneki, Sharon, The Qu
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BiBliOgRaPhy Stevens, David M, A Cr
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BiBliOgRaPhy Murray, BS, ‘The Sea
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introduction 1 Karl von Clausewitz,
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nOTes activities of the Japanese an
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nOTes 64 The chart of the reconstru
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nOTes 98 There appears to have been
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nOTes 131 Burrell, Mermaids Do Exis
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nOTes racial superiority, and probl
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nOTes 191 Waller, however, did not
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nOTes 213 MacArthur’s reasons may
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nOTes 236 Puleston quoted Japanese
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nOTes 258 As previously noted, USN
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nOTes 281 The range of the aircraft
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nOTes 297 EB Potter & Chester W Nim
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nOTes Darwin. [David Jenkins, Battl
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nOTes of the ASW escorts to sink su
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nOTes 353 In gaining this intellige
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nOTes 380 UKNA HS1/257 — SOE Far
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nOTes 404 NAA MP1185/8, Item 2037/7
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nOTes intelligence in this area has
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nOTes 451 The US Sigint establishme
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nOTes 477 O’Neill, Strategy and D
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nOTes Investigations, conducted sim
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nOTes 528 The Communists claimed th
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nOTes 554 ‘Do you think in Septem
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securing southeast asia: Malayan em
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nOTes London, 2000, p. 226. Stateme
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nOTes 639 NAA A8580/1, Item Z1/11
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nOTes 668 A good impression of the
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nOTes 704 Later in the campaign mor
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nOTes requirements issued by higher
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nOTes Defense to establish why a pa
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nOTes 798 Targets fell into three c
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826 Commander RG Ray, RAN, (Rtd), c
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nOTes 856 Despite the success of th
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inTROducTiOn 887 In New Britain in
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Chin Peng, 189, 192-3 China, People
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i Warrego, 62, 121 Whyalla, 119, Ya
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l Han River operations, 168-172 nat
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unreadiness for Malayan Emergency,
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index 371
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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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