Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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PROPPing uP a dOMinO: VieTnaM 1967–71 be those equipped with modern systems of superior range. The RAN’s new guided missile destroyers admirably fitted this description. 789 After reporting to 7th Fleet, and a period of briefings and training in the Subic Bay area in the Philippines, HMAS Hobart was assigned to SEA DRAGON in May 1967. This was to be the first of many occasions on which Australian ships operated off the DRV coast. All RAN units attached to the 7th Fleet, including the Daring class destroyer HMAS Vendetta, spent time on this station while the operation continued. In the words of Rear Admiral Doyle, RAN, who commanded Perth on her first deployment, this was ‘part of the second war in Vietnam’, where ships operated in hostile territory and were at risk from coastal defence sites and the potential threat of attack by NVA aircraft. 790 Intelligence support for SEA DRAGON was impressive. To add to the general intelligence picture distributed in the CINCPACFLT intelligence summaries and supporting information from COMUSMACV, specific information was supplied from the results of photo-reconnaissance missions undertaken by 7th Fleet aircraft to identify both potential WBLCs and enemy coastal defence sites. The latter were each assigned an alpha-numeric identity, and information on the number and type of weapons occupying the site was maintained in a ‘CD Site Register’ (later the ‘North Vietnam Naval Gunfire Support List’). This was issued monthly by the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Facility in Hawaii and updated by weekly signal. 791 Reconnaissance missions were flown whenever weather permitted, but USN reports show that poor visibility over the target areas did degrade the accuracy of the NGS list. 792 The second source on coastal defences was from electronic intelligence detections. Many of the NVA batteries were believed to be radar-directed, and the characteristics of these emitters were recorded and analysed by USN airborne collection assets. The information was passed to ships equipped with EW receivers, which could thus be alerted when a coastal defence site illuminated them. The high number of EW detections of NVA artillery sites caused 7th Fleet to order a ‘crash’ program of fitting radar noise jammers to counter the threat in 1967. RAN ships had well-trained and effective EW teams as part of their ships’ companies, but it appears that no electronic intelligence operators were embarked for special collection tasks. 793 In January 1968, intelligence suggested a more serious threat to the safety of SEA DRAGON ships in the shape of the SSN-2 Styx surface-to-surface missile. With a range of 15-20nm and an in-built radar homing head, this Soviet designed missile flew at high-subsonic speed and carried a warhead sufficient to sink or seriously damage a destroyer-sized target. The intelligence report was associated with a site at Thanh Hoa where a surface-to-air missile complex was reported in February 1968, the premise being that the SSN-2 would defend the site by keeping SEA DRAGON ships well to seaward and beyond gun range. The threat — although never confirmed — had the desired effect, and ships were ordered to remain outside 20nm from the North Vietnamese coast at that point. 794 245
246 Missing Pieces The third source of intelligence was found in the 7 th Fleet operation orders covering all maritime operations, including SEA DRAGON. These contained basic information on the operating environment and enemy defence likely to be encountered. Later and more detailed intelligence on targets, radar sites, coastal defences and lucrative WBLC zones were signalled as the information came to hand. Messages of long-term significance were designated ‘turn over’ messages and sequentially numbered. They were incorporated in the turnover packs maintained by SEA DRAGON ships for their reliefs and periodically superseded by printed amendments to the operation orders. This system ensured that ships assigned to SEA DRAGON or other operations could reliably be made familiar with changes in the situation when they arrived to join the relevant task group. 795 The guided missle destroyer HMAS Hobart fires one of her 5-inch guns on the gunline off Vietnam, 1968
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Papers in Australian Maritime Affai
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© Copyright Commonwealth of Austra
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disclaimer The views expressed are
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vi No. 13 Future Environmental Poli
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viii instinct ensured that even fau
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x Missing Pieces 4. Taking the Offe
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xii Maps 1. Pursuit of MV Romolo by
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xiv glossary In this book, place na
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xvi Missing Pieces CCS Combined Chi
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xviii Missing Pieces NGS Naval Gunf
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introduction By ‘intelligence’
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inTROducTiOn commander’s requirem
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Figure 2 - Desirable Intelligence f
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inTROducTiOn Sigint involves the in
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inTROducTiOn In her study of the ca
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1. setting the scene - The Ran and
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seTTing The scene - The Ran and iTs
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2. Operations against italy, Vichy
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Pursuit of MV Romolo, June 1940 OPe
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OPeRaTiOns againsT iTaly, Vichy FRa
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3. Facing the Japanese Onslaught, 1
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Facing The JaPanese OnslaughT 1941-
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4. Taking the Offensive, 1942—45
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Map 9
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 treate
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 across
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 for ne
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 on 15
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 The Al
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 during
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 to pre
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 At a c
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 presen
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 have t
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 There
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 A simi
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 In the
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Americ
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The bridge of HMAS Australia Taking
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 confus
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 W J Do
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 guns.
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Barbey
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5. a united nations ‘Police actio
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a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn
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6. securing southeast asia: Malayan
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secuRing sOuTheasT asia: Malayan eM
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Page 216 and 217: secuRing sOuTheasT asia: Malayan eM
Page 242 and 243: 7. Propping up a domino: Vietnam, 1
Page 244 and 245: PROPPing uP a dOMinO: VieTnaM 1967-
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Page 268 and 269: Damage received by HMAS Hobart afte
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Page 288 and 289: OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns Bureau
Page 290 and 291: OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns up the
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Page 294 and 295: codebreaking appendix - australian
Page 296 and 297: aPPendix practices and personnel, b
Page 298 and 299: aPPendix in the chain of command of
Page 300 and 301: aPPendix units’ in RAAF terminolo
Page 302 and 303: archival Records national archives
Page 304 and 305: CO1022 South East Asia Department:
Page 306 and 307: BiBliOgRaPhy Clausewitz, Karl von,
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introduction 1 Karl von Clausewitz,
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nOTes activities of the Japanese an
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nOTes 64 The chart of the reconstru
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nOTes 98 There appears to have been
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nOTes 131 Burrell, Mermaids Do Exis
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nOTes racial superiority, and probl
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nOTes 191 Waller, however, did not
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nOTes 213 MacArthur’s reasons may
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nOTes 236 Puleston quoted Japanese
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nOTes 258 As previously noted, USN
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nOTes 281 The range of the aircraft
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nOTes 297 EB Potter & Chester W Nim
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nOTes Darwin. [David Jenkins, Battl
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nOTes of the ASW escorts to sink su
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nOTes 353 In gaining this intellige
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nOTes 380 UKNA HS1/257 — SOE Far
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nOTes 404 NAA MP1185/8, Item 2037/7
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nOTes intelligence in this area has
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nOTes 451 The US Sigint establishme
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nOTes 477 O’Neill, Strategy and D
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nOTes Investigations, conducted sim
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nOTes 528 The Communists claimed th
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nOTes 554 ‘Do you think in Septem
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securing southeast asia: Malayan em
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nOTes London, 2000, p. 226. Stateme
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nOTes 639 NAA A8580/1, Item Z1/11
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nOTes 668 A good impression of the
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nOTes 704 Later in the campaign mor
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nOTes requirements issued by higher
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nOTes Defense to establish why a pa
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nOTes 798 Targets fell into three c
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826 Commander RG Ray, RAN, (Rtd), c
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nOTes 856 Despite the success of th
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inTROducTiOn 887 In New Britain in
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Chin Peng, 189, 192-3 China, People
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i Warrego, 62, 121 Whyalla, 119, Ya
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l Han River operations, 168-172 nat
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unreadiness for Malayan Emergency,
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index 371
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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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