Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

360 Missing Pieces
ULTRA material because SSO personnel were under the direct and personal command of
Marshall and not him. [Benson, A History, p. 142.]
872 NAA A11093/1, Item 311/236G — RAAF Command Allied Force SWPA minute unreferenced
of 1 June 1944.
873 NAA A6923, Item 16/6/289 — AMF Central Bureau, unreferenced letter from Lieutenant
Colonel Sandford of 26 January 1945.
874 Alison Ind, Spy Ring Pacific: The Story of the Allied Intelligence Bureau in South East Asia,
Weidenfield & Nicholson, London, 1958, foreword. Written by the director, this description
of the activities of AIB stated that its sections conducted 264 missions, including 155 by
SRD into the Celebes and Borneo in 1944—45. The price was 164 agents killed, 174 missing
and 75 captured.
875 NAA B3476/0, Item 160B — NEA Intercept Stations: General.
876 Douglas A MacArthur & staff, Reports of General MacArthur, Department of the Army,
Washington, DC, 1966, p. 54, footnote 20.
877 Winter, The Intrigue Master, p. 172.
878 ATIS grew from 36 personnel to over 2000 by the war’s end. In the course of its work it
screened over 350,000 captured documents and translated over 18,000 of these. It published
over 2800 interrogation reports. [Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior, &
John Connor (eds), The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History, Oxford University
Press, Melbourne, 1995, pp. 30—31.]
879 ‘It may well be that the present day allied intelligence cooperation has proved to be the most
lasting and important legacy of Australia’s experience of coalition warfare in the Second
World War’. [Horner, Australia and Allied Intelligence, p. 44.]
880 AWM54, Item 327/25/2 — War establishment intelligence groups, shows that the Australian
Army alone had 430 all ranks assigned to CBB, with an additional 14 at ATIS, 120 in the
interrogation section and another 51 in photo-interpretation.
881 NAA B5436/2, Item part K — Critique of CBB, 1. The critique was compiled at the end of the
war by the director, Colonel Sinkov, US Army, and his two deputies,‚ Lieutenant Colonel
Sandford , Australian Military Force, and Wing Commander Booth, RAAF. It took time to
recruit, train and dispatch US personnel to fill out the ranks of CB.
882 The main task of these sections was to DF and intercept Japanese administrative circuits, to
provide warnings of Japanese air raids, and to break the codes. [Ballard, On ULTRA Active
Service, pp. 197, 200 & 202.]
883 It was 1WU operators who intercepted the signal in February 1944 that reported the
abandonment of Rabaul as an advanced operating base for the IJN air arm. [Bleakley, The
Eavesdroppers, pp. 116—117.]
884 1WU was bolstered by linguists assigned by the US Army. The unit had an interesting war,
finishing in Biak from August 1944.
885 Benson, A History, pp. 85—86. Possibly against his wishes, MacArthur had no option but to
place dependence upon the Australians as he was singularly unsuccessful in extracting US
special radio intercept companies from the US Army. It was not until 1944 that additional
US companies arrived to join the 126th, which itself did not begin operation in Australia
until November 1943.
886 The RAAF intercept operation travelled to Leyte aboard a US command ship and landed at
Tacloban on 20 October 1944. [Bleakley, The Eavesdroppers, pp. 178—180.]