Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
554 ‘Do you think in September it might be possible to send up Sydney for about 2 or 3 months
operational flying if the Korea business is still going’? [UKNA ADM 205/76 — First Sea Lord
Correspondence, Fraser letter of 3 April 1951.]
555 The key postings of Commander (Air) responsible for the overall conduct of the Aviation
Division, the flight deck officer responsible for all aircraft movements on and off the flight
deck, the landing signals officer responsible for guiding the aircraft to a safe landing, and
the commanding officers of the three embarked air squadrons were all filled by officers on
loan from the RN. [Fred T Lane, & Gerry Lane, ‘HMAS Sydney in Korea: The Sea Fury Pilot’,
in Tom Frame, James Goldrick and Peter Jones (eds), Reflections on the RAN, Kangaroo Press,
Kenthurst, NSW, 1991, pp. 275—284.]
556 Interview of Fred Lane, Korean War Sea Fury pilot, by the author 12 March 2003, hereafter
the ‘Lane interview’. The intelligence gathered included a full set of handover notes from
HMS Ocean, including maps and target details.
557 O’Neill noted that other carriers adopted the system of identifying and contacting downed
airmen developed by Sydney as well. [O’Neill, Combat Operations, p. 475.]
558 Norman Lee, ‘HMAS Sydney in Korea: The Firefly Pilot’, in Tom Frame, James Goldrick & Peter
Jones (eds), Reflections on the RAN, Kangaroo Press, Kenthurst, NSW, 1991, pp. 285—290.
During her third patrol off the west coast, by 13 November there was not one serviceable
railway line in Sydney’s area of operations. At least one bridge and a considerable length of
track on every one had been destroyed.
559 On one occasion, Sydney’s aircraft noticed a small point of land on the south bank of the
Sariwon River that had not been noticed a few days previously. On closer inspection it
proved to be a group of nested barges fully laden, which were attacked and destroyed. [Lane
interview.]
560 Sydney’s team was pleased with the performance of the ship’s Type 96 radar, which proved
capable of detecting aircraft at a range of 190nm—an exceptional distance. [Alan Zammit,
‘HMAS Sydney’, in MB Pears & Frederick Kirkland (eds), Korea Remembered: The RAN, ARA
and RAAF in the Korean War of 1950—1953, Doctrine Wing, Combined Arms Development
Centre, Georges Heights, NSW, 1998, p. 326.]
561 The threat of submarine attack was an active concern to the UN Naval Command
throughout the war, and at the outbreak of hostilities great efforts were made to
cobble together ASW harbour defences for Japanese ports. ASW screens were
finally relaxed in April 1953. [NHC, C7F Post 46 Reports, West Coast Blockade and
Patrol Group Serial: 960/6(a), June 29, 1953—HMS Newcastle, Report of Proceedings
18 April—3 May 1953.]
562 The Naval Security Group Yokosuka included in its mission the detection of Soviet submarine
activities that might have indicated a Soviet intention to use its submarines to harass or
attack UN units. [Aid, ‘US Comint’, pp. 42—43.] As the ASW threat continued throughout
the war, one can only conclude that Sigint was unable to provide the true picture. After the
war it was learned that the Soviets took the decision to keep their submarines out of the area
of operations of the UN Naval Command. [Farrar-Hockley, A Distant Obligation, p. 85.]
563 BS Murray, ‘The Sea War in Korea 1950—1953’, Naval Historical Review, June 1976, pp. 3—19.
It was the practice for the TG 95.1 carrier to conduct a sweep up the occupied west coast as
far as the Chinese border at first light—the so-called ‘milk run’. Sydney’s photo-reconnaissance
Sea Furies also photographed likely target areas about every two days. [Lane Interview.]
564 Farrar-Hockley, A Distant Obligation, p. 379 and footnote.
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