Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
856 Despite the success of the Ton class CMS in Malaysia they had shortcomings in their patrol
role. [UKNA DEFE 24/98 — Reports on Operations in East and West Malaysia 1964—1966.
COMFEF letter 1763.FEF.143/12.Ops of 23 November 1966, annex G. Incident Report no. 3,
23 March 1965.]
857 DNI was able to provide detailed information on Vung Tau and an assessment of the risks
faced by HMAS Sydney before her first trooping deployment in 1965, but whether this had
been garnered by the RAN or collected from the USN is not clear.
858 RAN officers did not serve on any 7th Fleet staff during the conflict. There was one RAN
staff officer attached to HQAFV in Saigon, largely for administrative duties.
appendix One—australian sigint and intelligence contributions in wwii
859 Pfennigwerth, A Man of Intelligence, pp. 54—7.
860 David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret Writing, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1966,
pp. 586—587. While the Japanese attempted to change codes regularly to defeat Allied
cryptanalysis and to preserve code integrity, the system collapsed under the difficulties of
distributing new code materials to garrisons and forces spread over a theatre of nearly 20
million square miles, especially as Allied strategy began to isolate strong points from the
Home Islands.
861 Alan Stripp, Codebreaker in the Far East, Frank Cass, London, 1989, p. 66.
862 Pfennigwerth, A Man of Intelligence, p. 146.
863 Layton And I Was There, p. 358. Layton also stated that CAST was providing intelligence on
Japanese forces from JN-25 by 17 January 1942. It is confirmed that by March 1942 FECB
was able to warn that the Japanese were planning an attack on Sri Lanka, planned to take
place on 1 April. Winton, ULTRA in the Pacific: How Breaking Japanese Codes and Ciphers
Affected Naval Operations Against Japan, Leo Cooper, London, 1993, p. 23.
864 Parker, A Priceless Advantage, p.20.
865 WJ Holmes, ‘Naval Intelligence in the War Against Japan 1941—1945: The View from Pearl
Harbor’, in Craig L Symonds (ed), New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at
the Fourth Naval History Symposium, US Naval Academy, 25—26 October 1979, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, Md, 1981, p. 354.
866 Pfennigwerth, A Man of intelligence, pp. 167—176.
867 Benson, A History, p. 64.
868 Pfennigwerth, A Man of Intelligence, pp. 213—216.
869 NAA B5436, Item part B — Central Bureau Technical Records Part B—Naval Air-Ground
Communications, is a heavily expurgated extract from a report on CBB codebreaking. On
p.11 it made clear that decodes of IJN air-ground intercepts yielded valuable information
on enemy transport and convoy arrangements, which were invariably passed to 7th Fleet
Intelligence Center. Enemy reports of Allied submarine activity were similarly supplied.
870 Australians occupied the two of three deputy director positions throughout the war.
871 Benson, A History, p. 88. By the end of the war CB was staffed by officers and other ranks
from the US Army, Australian Army, RAAF, RAN, UK forces, Canadian Army and New
Zealand, together with civilian cryptanalysts, and had grown to a strength of almost 4500
personnel. MacArthur resisted even direct orders from General Marshall that his command
was to adopt the special security officer (SSO) protocols for handling and disseminating
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