Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

340 Missing Pieces
565 Lansdown, With the Carriers, p. 58. By the time HMAS Sydney arrived, the initial problems
encountered in naval aircraft supporting ground forces had been largely resolved. These
had arisen because of different doctrine, a lack of communications, a shortage of airborne
spotters, and the use of inappropriate charts by the carrier aircraft. Field observed that the
differences between land-based and naval air procedures for delivering close air support
were never satisfactorily resolved throughout the war, despite being discussed at the highest
levels. [Field, History, pp. 388—394.]
566 Lansdown, With the Carriers, p. 181. Leopard was the codename a US Army officer charged
with coordinating and leading intelligence collection and other raids into Communist-held
territory. Murray also recorded that the guerrillas provided ‘some very good information
from time to time, particularly of enemy troop movements and new gun positions’. [Murray,
‘The Sea War’, p. 17.]
567 Lansdown, With the Carriers, pp. 201—202. The guerilla reports also indicated that the aircraft
had been more successful than the aircrew had claimed. Since it is more customary for
aircrew (among others) to claim greater success than their efforts actually achieved, one
suspects that this modesty on the part of Sydney’s fliers might have been induced by stern
warnings from Harries not to make exaggerated claims. More practically, it was difficult
for the pilots and observers to accurately record the effects of their attacks on other than
discrete targets such as buildings, railways and bridges and post-operation photography
would not necessarily reveal details of personnel casualties inflicted.
568 Lee, ‘Firefly Pilot’, pp. 288—298.
569 O’Neill, Combat Operations, pp. 470—471.
570 Cagle & Manson, The Sea War, p. v.
571 O’Neill quoted from a report by Mao Zedong in 1953: ‘The important reason that we cannot
win decisive victory in Korea is our lack of naval strength. Without naval support, we have
to confine our operations to frontal attacks along the line limited by sea’. [O’Neill, Combat
Operations, p. 523.]
572 O’Neill, Strategy and Diplomacy, pp. 154—155.
573 O’Neill, Strategy and Diplomacy, p. 406.
574 Apart for membership and support of UNCOK before the outbreak of the war, Australians also
served on the UN Commission on reconstruction of Korea and acted as a link between the
Rhee Government and the UN Command. [O’Neill, Strategy and Diplomacy, pp. 403—404.]
575 For example, HMAS Warramunga was unable to join USN ships in company in a shoot
against suspected Korean aircraft, because its gunnery director could not track the targets.
[O’Neill, Combat Operations, p. 429.]
576 However, as will be elaborated upon in Chapter 6, the RAN turned its efforts to enhancing its
ASW performance. This was as a part of its contribution to British Commonwealth defence,
the British view of which was outlined in First Sea Lord Fraser’s letter to CNS Collins of 27
April 1950. [UKNA ADM 205/74 — First Sea Lord’s Correspondence.]
577 UKNA ADM 205/74—First Sea Lord’s Correspondence.
578 O’Neill recorded that when RAN officers had command of UN forces they performed well,
and that this engendered acceptance of RAN competence. [O’Neill, Combat Operations, p.
528.] This is not disputed, but there was no extended RAN experience of higher command
such as was enjoyed by CTF 44/74 in SWPA during WWII.
579 Not even the British Commonwealth Force Korea HQ had a naval element. [NAA A2107,
Item K10/4 — Korean Operation Organisation HQ BCFK.]