Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn’: kORea 1950–53 Map 16 - Korean Peninsula 161
162 Missing Pieces The United Nations made plans to ‘sever’ Korea from the Asian mainland by a concentrated program of gun- and air-delivered ordnance aimed at destroying the ability of the NKPA and Chinese to resupply their forces. Later, as ceasefire negotiations dragged on, naval forces were employed to bolster UN territorial claims by subjecting areas of the land to effective control by naval gunfire. An outline map of Korea and the general areas of UN maritime operations taken from Farrar-Hockley, A Distant Obligation, is at Map 16. Operations on both coasts presented difficulties. Charts were poor or non-existent and their accuracy, especially on the west coast, was doubtful. In particular, the navigability of rivers and channels was not known. Under these conditions, the existence of minefields could not be established with any certainty, and even well-laid minefields were likely to ‘walk’ under the influence of the tides and to present unexpected hazards. Enemy defences were mobile; artillery could be placed to interdict shipping channels with comparative ease, and possibly without their presence being noticed until they opened fire. Set against these difficulties, the UN forces had the services of Koreans from both north and south who waged guerrilla warfare against the NKPA and the Chinese (and probably between themselves). At most times the United Nations also maintained total air superiority over the mainland up to the border with Manchuria, and air reconnaissance was a fruitful source of intelligence. However, the NKPA also quickly proved adept at camouflage and concealment and, as its air defence systems grew and matured, they were often able to drive off UN air attacks and to deter close reconnaissance. Finally, weather had its effect on naval warfare. Typhoons disrupted UN operations and damaged ships, while the extreme cold of the Korean winter made life difficult and uncomfortable for ships companies, particularly in Australian ships with minimal heating arrangements, while rendering their use of weapons subject to failure, delay and breakdown. The naval war was inextricably linked to the phases of the land war. At first, naval forces escorted troops and supplies to the beleaguered UN forces stemming the Communist assault and provided naval gunfire support (NGS) and other interdiction. The principal action was the UN amphibious landing at Inchon in September 1950, which led to the collapse of the NKPA position in South Korea. The second phase was in support of the advancing UN land forces as they forged northwards towards the Yalu River border with China. The third phase was from November 1950, again in support of those forces as they retreated in the face of attacks by the PLA, including interdiction and evacuations. 512 The fourth phase ran from the stopping of the Chinese offensive in June 1951 to the eventual armistice in 1953. At the outset in July 1950, Rear Admiral Andrewes, USN, defined the task of his force as the enforcement of a blockade of the coasts occupied by the North Koreans, the prevention of infiltration by sea on coasts held by the South, and the provision of naval support to UN land forces. 513 By April 1951, at the time of the reorganisation of the
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Papers in Australian Maritime Affai
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© Copyright Commonwealth of Austra
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disclaimer The views expressed are
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vi No. 13 Future Environmental Poli
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viii instinct ensured that even fau
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x Missing Pieces 4. Taking the Offe
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xii Maps 1. Pursuit of MV Romolo by
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xiv glossary In this book, place na
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xvi Missing Pieces CCS Combined Chi
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xviii Missing Pieces NGS Naval Gunf
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introduction By ‘intelligence’
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inTROducTiOn commander’s requirem
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Figure 2 - Desirable Intelligence f
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inTROducTiOn Sigint involves the in
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inTROducTiOn In her study of the ca
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1. setting the scene - The Ran and
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seTTing The scene - The Ran and iTs
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2. Operations against italy, Vichy
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Pursuit of MV Romolo, June 1940 OPe
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OPeRaTiOns againsT iTaly, Vichy FRa
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3. Facing the Japanese Onslaught, 1
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Facing The JaPanese OnslaughT 1941-
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4. Taking the Offensive, 1942—45
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Map 9
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 Map 10
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 treate
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Taking The OFFensiVe 1942-45 across
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secuRing sOuTheasT asia: Malayan eM
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7. Propping up a domino: Vietnam, 1
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PROPPing uP a dOMinO: VieTnaM 1967-
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Map 26 - Operation MARKET TIME PROP
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Damage received by HMAS Hobart afte
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8. Final Observations and conclusio
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OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns Bureau
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OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns up the
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OBseRVaTiOns and cOnclusiOns level
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codebreaking appendix - australian
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aPPendix practices and personnel, b
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aPPendix in the chain of command of
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aPPendix units’ in RAAF terminolo
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archival Records national archives
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CO1022 South East Asia Department:
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BiBliOgRaPhy Clausewitz, Karl von,
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BiBliOgRaPhy Harper, Norman, A Grea
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BiBliOgRaPhy Maneki, Sharon, The Qu
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BiBliOgRaPhy Stevens, David M, A Cr
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BiBliOgRaPhy Murray, BS, ‘The Sea
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introduction 1 Karl von Clausewitz,
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nOTes activities of the Japanese an
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nOTes 64 The chart of the reconstru
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nOTes 98 There appears to have been
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nOTes 131 Burrell, Mermaids Do Exis
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nOTes racial superiority, and probl
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nOTes 191 Waller, however, did not
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nOTes 213 MacArthur’s reasons may
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nOTes 236 Puleston quoted Japanese
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nOTes 258 As previously noted, USN
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nOTes 281 The range of the aircraft
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nOTes 297 EB Potter & Chester W Nim
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nOTes Darwin. [David Jenkins, Battl
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nOTes of the ASW escorts to sink su
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nOTes 353 In gaining this intellige
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nOTes 380 UKNA HS1/257 — SOE Far
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nOTes 404 NAA MP1185/8, Item 2037/7
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nOTes intelligence in this area has
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nOTes 451 The US Sigint establishme
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nOTes 477 O’Neill, Strategy and D
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nOTes Investigations, conducted sim
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nOTes 528 The Communists claimed th
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nOTes 554 ‘Do you think in Septem
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securing southeast asia: Malayan em
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nOTes London, 2000, p. 226. Stateme
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nOTes 639 NAA A8580/1, Item Z1/11
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nOTes 668 A good impression of the
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nOTes 704 Later in the campaign mor
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nOTes requirements issued by higher
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nOTes Defense to establish why a pa
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nOTes 798 Targets fell into three c
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826 Commander RG Ray, RAN, (Rtd), c
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nOTes 856 Despite the success of th
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inTROducTiOn 887 In New Britain in
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Chin Peng, 189, 192-3 China, People
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i Warrego, 62, 121 Whyalla, 119, Ya
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l Han River operations, 168-172 nat
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unreadiness for Malayan Emergency,
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index 371
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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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