Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

144 Missing Pieces
The result of this well-developed planning and application of resources was a small
gem of a joint operation, where not only was adequate intelligence provided to the
operational commander, but he expertly applied it as well.
Outcomes
The operations studied in this chapter varied widely, from an individual effort by
a small fishing boat, through a fleet action off Biak, to a long-running campaign of
attrition off the Australian east coast. Despite the lack of a common thread between
them, the nature of the operation is secondary to the consideration of the contribution
intelligence made to each one. And it can be fairly said that the contribution increased
as time went on. In most cases the facility with which that intelligence was applied to
the operation also improved.
JAYWICK was a gamble, the operational desirability of which apparently overrode
considerations of adequate intelligence support. The results achieved justified the
risk and, in September 1943, the potential loss of one ex-Japanese fishing boat and 14
Allied servicemen was relatively a small price to pay. But the operation shows signs
of having lacked the effective operational intelligence input that might have been
available to an organisation arranged along more professional and conventional lines,
and this runs against the trend in the SWPA.
The east coast battle against IJN submarines was won, but largely by default. CSWPSF
and his subordinate commanders had excessive difficulty applying operational
intelligence effectively. The lessons emerging from the Battle of the Atlantic were slow
to filter into the training of the SWPA escort force, while cooperation between naval and
air force commands was frequently unsatisfactory. This battle may not have ranked as
highly in the priorities of the intelligence organisations and their cryptanalysts as other
concurrent struggles, but despite this, progress was being made, and better training
and tactics — and more appropriate application of intelligence — might very well have
defeated any resumed IJN attack.
By contrast, Wewak Force’s operations demonstrated how a cooperative and harmonious
exchange of intelligence could achieve excellent operational results. True, the enemy
had all but disappeared from the maritime environment, but the composition of
Wewak Force was shaped accordingly. Working with the resources he had, and using
his intelligence effectively, Lieutenant Dovers and his band of small ships discharged
their task of supporting 6th Division with distinction. The advances made since the
days of Milne Bay, Buna and Operation LILLIPUT are striking.
The Allies’ lack of sufficient hydrographic and topographical intelligence in 1942 had
a direct bearing on the ability of SWPA naval forces to execute effective amphibious
and resupply operations. This attracted little sympathy from GHQ, but Vice Admiral