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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn’: kORea 1950–53<br />

command structure for UN naval forces, the missions assigned to TF 95, in broad order<br />

of priority at that time, had expanded to include blockade, NGS, bombardment, mine<br />

warfare, escort duties, ASW, coastal fishing surveillance and control, and intelligence<br />

collection. 514<br />

Australia’s naval contribution to the UN forces in Korea was modest but nevertheless,<br />

important. As O’Neill said, it ‘had no profound influence on the course of the war’. 515<br />

However, for the RAN it was an important operational experience, not to mention a<br />

significant test of logistics and maintenance support. The incidents selected to illustrate<br />

the operations undertaken by RAN ships and the contribution of intelligence thereto<br />

will demonstrate that, although operationally it was a very different problem from<br />

WWII, certain enduring lessons remained valid.<br />

naval warfare on the korean east coast<br />

The east coast of Korea from the 39th to 42nd north parallels contains the vital ports<br />

of North Korea and supports a great deal of its industrial plant. Important road and rail<br />

communication links run along the relatively narrow coastal plain, backed by rugged<br />

mountains that rise in the north to over 3000 metres. The 200-metre line runs from<br />

about 30nm offshore near Wonsan in the south to less than 10nm off Chongjin in the<br />

north. As a result, North Korean ports are easily blockaded, there are rich pickings for<br />

an aggressive blockading force, the entire coastline is accessible to NGS, and mines<br />

become less of a concern the further north one moves. These features dictated the<br />

nature of the UN Naval Command’s war on the east coast.<br />

CTF 77 deployed his fast carrier forces off the east coast for striking North Korean<br />

targets, and to provide close air support on the right flank of the UN land forces. The<br />

carriers, teamed with NGS forces of UN cruisers and destroyers, and battleships on<br />

occasion, systematically wrecked the North Korean industrial infrastructure the length<br />

of the coast, almost to the border with the Soviet Union. Wonsan, the largest port in<br />

Korea was the target of an amphibious landing, and the object of a UN naval siege that<br />

lasted 841 days. In December 1950, Songjin and Hungnam were the scenes of major<br />

evacuations of UN forces in the wake of the first Chinese attack.<br />

The east was predominantly, but not exclusively, an ‘American’ coast, and<br />

Commonwealth carriers, cruisers and destroyers operated there as elements of TG<br />

95.2 from time to time. East coast islands were important to the UN as bases for the<br />

insertion of agents, raids into enemy territory or the collection of intelligence. <strong>Australian</strong><br />

ships supported these missions and assisted in defending the islands against North<br />

Korean attempts to capture them. 516<br />

Between 25 February and 8 March 1952 HMAS Warramunga assumed the duties<br />

of CTG 95.22, with responsibility for the Northern Patrol line between Songjin and<br />

163

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