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Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

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152 <strong>Missing</strong> <strong>Pieces</strong><br />

Following the end of WWII, RAN planners were confronted with a conundrum: at a time<br />

when its ships were worn out from over six years of warfare and many of its experienced<br />

cadres were disappearing back into civilian employment, the political leadership was<br />

expecting Australia to ‘pull its weight’ in regional affairs. 462 A modern and balanced<br />

<strong>Australian</strong> force capable of independent operations in the Southeast Asian region and<br />

beyond had to be created. In 1946 the RAN gained agreement for a building program to<br />

boost its destroyer force; two Battle class were laid down and plans for four of the larger,<br />

more modern Daring class were approved in principle. 463 The 1943-44 government<br />

also agreed to the opening of negotiations with the Admiralty for the transfer of two<br />

light fleet carriers to the RAN, and on 2 June 1947 the carrier program was included<br />

in the Five-Year Defence Plan announced by the government. This significant decision<br />

required a restructuring of the <strong>Australian</strong> Squadron, an increase in personnel to man<br />

the new ships and aircraft, and the improvement and recommissioning of two former<br />

RN airfields on the east coast for use by the new squadrons — a considerable staffwork,<br />

recruiting and training burden. 464<br />

In February 1948, Rear Admiral John Collins, RAN, became the first <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Australian</strong><br />

Naval officer to hold the position of CNS. Despite Admiralty suggestions that Collins<br />

was too inexperienced to do justice to the position, the <strong>Australian</strong> Government held<br />

firm in its decision to appoint him in preference to another British officer. But Collins’<br />

new post was no sinecure. By mid-1949, the RAN’s segment of the Five-Year Defence<br />

Plan was foundering. The RAN’s inability to attract sufficient manpower caused CNS<br />

to decommission three ships, while construction delays meant that only one of the two<br />

Battle class destroyers could be completed within the plan’s timeframe. The second<br />

aircraft carrier would not now be available until 1952. 465 In October 1950, the RAN<br />

had a personnel target of 15,173 regulars and 7580 reserves to reach by July 1951,<br />

with one light fleet carrier and its carrier air group, three cruisers (obselete), five<br />

destroyers, 12 frigates and 32 old corvettes. Four Daring class destroyers were under<br />

construction, while five wartime destroyers of the Q class were being converted to<br />

fast ASW frigates. 466<br />

Accordingly, the small number of destroyers available in July 1950 caused ACNB<br />

considerable difficulties in providing ships for Korean service: only three Tribal<br />

class destroyers were in commission, HMA Ships Arunta, Warramunga, and Bataan,<br />

all of WWII construction. The <strong>Australian</strong> Government committed the frigate HMAS<br />

Shoalhaven and destroyer HMAS Warramunga at the outbreak of hostilities in Korea,<br />

and Bataan would later replace Shoalhaven. The only other destroyer available was<br />

the incomplete new Battle class HMAS Tobruk, while manpower shortages meant that<br />

crewing ships for active service caused considerable posting turbulence. 467 The RAN<br />

was as unready as most of the UN navies for action in Korea.<br />

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