Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
258 As previously noted, USN and RAN practice was to fly cruiser aircraft only during daylight.
This was enforced by the difficulties of landing and recovering floatplanes at night and the
very limited surveillance capability of an aircraft operating at night without radar. [Loxton
The Shame of Savo, pp. 43—44.]
259 Dyer, The Amphibians Came to Conquer, p. 298, listed the breakdown by type.
260 Feldt, The Coast Watchers, pp. 109—112, and Gill, Royal Australian Navy, 1939—1945,
pp.122—124.
261 The performance of this intelligence system in reporting the first Japanese air raid was
impressive. The Coastwatcher message was detected by the Coast Radio Service in Port
Moresby and relayed to Townsville for the senior intelligence officer. It was retransmitted
to Canberra and then out on the RAN Fleet broadcast and to Hawaii for the US Pacific Fleet
broadcast three minutes later. [Lawrence Durrant, The Seawatchers: The Story of Australia’s
Coast Radio Service, Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1986, p. 159.]
262 Feldt, The Coast Watchers, p. 140.
263 McCain did not report the results of searches conducted on 7 August until 0200 on the
8th. In fact, bad weather had prevented searches west and southwest of Guadalcanal. As
with the report on the following day’s aborted searches, this information would have been
immensely valuable to Turner and Fletcher at the time the searches were cancelled so that
alternatives could be considered.
264 The RAN investigation into the failure of Canberra’s radar to detect the Japanese force
determined that her Type 271 radar had been detecting cruisers at 13nm and was said to
be operating reliably on the night of 8—9 August. The investigation showed that Canberra
had at least three detection opportunities, missed apparently because of a failure to keep a
plot of radar contacts and the inability of the operator on watch to distinguish between land
returns and ship echoes. [AWM 79, Item 756/3 — RDF Aspect of Loss of HMAS Canberra.]
265 Loxton described a staff meeting held by Crutchley before the summons to Turner’s flagship
at around 2035 to discuss the significance of the morning’s reports from the Hudsons.
As the aircraft report indicated the IJN force was inferior to TF 62, the view was that the
Amphibious Group was not its immediate target. However, the possibility of a surface attack
was not ruled out. [Loxton, The Shame of Savo, pp. 110—111.]
266 ‘While pursuing a southeasterly course some 30 miles NE of Kieta we observed an enemy
Hudson bomber shadowing us at 0825 … We were spotted by another Hudson flying quite
low. Salvos from our 8-inch guns sent this observer on his way … These contacts naturally
caused us to assume that our intentions had been perceived by the enemy and more search
planes would appear’. Mikawa ordered a reduction in speed and a course change to the
northeast in an attempt to confuse his intentions from the aircraft. [Ohmae, ‘Battle of Savo
Island’, p. 230.]
267 NAA B6121/3, Item 105N — The Battle of Savo Island, ‘RACAS cypher log’. A patrolling fighter
from USS Wasp shot down a floatplane in the vicinity of Rekata Bay that morning, and Turner
concluded this was the destination of the force reported by the Hudsons. Crutchley’s Report
of Proceedings also contains that information. The aircraft was from Kako, one of Mikawa’s
cruisers.
268 Ohmae, ‘Battle of Savo Island’, p. 233. The only air reconnaissance was Japanese. ‘The
catapulted seaplanes reported three enemy cruisers patrolling the eastern entrance to the
sound south of Savo Id’. Despite the ‘poor’ weather conditions, the Japanese managed to
launch two air strikes against the Amphibious Force, one around midday on 8 August and
the other later in the afternoon.
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