Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

OPeRaTiOns againsT iTaly, Vichy FRance and geRMany 1939–42
The loss of Sydney with all hands would suggest a negative response but, despite the
high cost, Kormoran was indeed sunk. Sydney’s fate, and other incidents during HSK
interceptions, prompted the Admiralty to issue a reminder to its ships about methods
of eliminating doubt about the identities assumed by raiders, and the procedure to be
used in challenging them. It also warned commanding officers about underestimating
the fighting power of HSKs. This suggests that the Admiralty view was that Burnett
and his team had not used the intelligence at their disposal appropriately. 113
More than a year later, Adelaide escorting a convoy well off the West Australian coast
encountered a suspicious ship. Unable to get confirmation of its claimed identity from
the VESCAR system ashore, Adelaide remained at a safe range while the command
team determined from the identification cards that the ship was possibly the German
blockade-runner Ramses. The suspect appeared to be preparing to scuttle, at which stage
Adelaide opened fire, fearing that it was a ruse de guerre preparatory to launching an
attack on her. The ship sank shortly afterwards, and survivors confirmed its identity
as Ramses. Adelaide had not known that she was not faced with an HSK, but had used
her intelligence resources correctly to prevent any recurrence of the fates of the British
armed merchant cruisers and Sydney. Her commanding officer made specific reference
to the value and accuracy of the ‘German Armoured Merchant Ships’ identification
pack. 114
It was superior intelligence that defeated the raider threat world-wide. From a standing
start in 1940, by late 1941 there was sufficient information available to any cruiser
commanding officer to make appropriate decisions about closing suspicious merchant
ships, especially those that did not appear on the weekly VESCAR message for their
area. In all probability, it was not a shortage of intelligence but rather possible confusion
about the appropriate actions to be taken on detecting an HSK that caused incidents
such as the loss of Sydney.
Outcomes
The action against MV Romolo revealed serious shortcomings in strategic and
operational intelligence, air reconnaissance and the coordination of air and naval
operations. Spurgeon’s intelligence jigsaw had many missing pieces, and it was his
professionalism which led to the interception and sinking rather than the operational
planning and intelligence support given by Navy Office.
Collins and his command team used background intelligence on their enemy, rather
than the meagre intelligence they had on Italian Navy dispositions, to good effect off
Cape Spada. They were, of course, operating in a completely different milieu, where
the Mediterranean Fleet Commander led by example and encouraged his officers to
use their initiative. By hypothesising the very worst case for the destroyers under his
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