Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn’: kORea 1950–53
superior force and tactics. The old problems of coordination of joint operations soon
reappeared, as UN aircraft attacked friendly positions in the confusion. Unusually, it
was the Commonwealth navies that were best positioned to respond, and did so in
short order. The British Far East Fleet was in a concentration period, and had gathered
for a cruise in Japanese waters. Within a week of the outbreak of fighting British and
Australian naval forces were operating in support of UN forces, while the weak US 7th
fleet, Task Force (TF) 77, hurriedly assembled and sailed north from Taiwan. 477
• • • • •
Although they formed part of a UN force, ships assigned by their nations to operations in
Korea came under the operational command of the US Navy’s Commander Naval Force
Far East (COMNAVFE), headquartered in Tokyo, as part of TF 95 — the United Nations
Blockade and Escort Force. 478 From the very first days of the conflict, UN naval forces were
divided broadly into east and west coast task groups, with the east coast TG 95.2 under
USN command, and the west coast TG 95.1 under the command of the Flag Officer Secondin-Command
Far East Station (FO2ICFES), a British officer. Australian ships operated as
part of both task groups, being exchanged as the priorities of their employment changed.
On 3 April 1951, operational command of TF 95 shifted from COMNAVFE to C7F, creating
a single naval operational commander in place of three formerly. However, there was
no joint headquarters, with the army, navy, and air force chains of command operating
separately. 479 A diagram from Field, United States Naval Operations: Korea, showing the
command structure as it evolved in 1951 is at Figure 5. 480
UN naval forces used USN practices, doctrine and tactical instructions. While this might
have caused problems it did not, because many of the senior personnel involved had
recent experience in the Pacific war. There is evidence that, despite a USN penchant for
keeping their ships on a tight leash, with copious instructions covering every conceivable
eventuality, the Commonwealth ships enjoyed considerable degrees of autonomy, even
when part of a US-led TG. 481 The process of adjustment was assisted by the traditional
practice of producing handover notes for one’s relief and, where possible, by a face-toface
briefing. Vice Admiral Dyer, USN, the fourth Commander Task Force (CTF) 95,
commented that:
Without any reservations, the association of all these navies together has
not only been a very cordial and profitable one on an official basis, and at
the highest levels, but on an unofficial and ship’s company level. There
has been no major difficulty. 482
The staff of COMNAVFE remained predominantly American throughout the conflict. Some
RN officers were attached in specialist positions, and there was a British naval liaison
officer, whose duties are somewhat unclear. However, no RAN officers were attached to
the UN naval staff, nor any subordinate staff during the Korean War. 483
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