Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

PROPPing uP a dOMinO: VieTnaM 1967–71
three patrol zones under the direction of COMNAVFORV and the operational control of
CTF 115, with destroyers patrolling a zone at about 20nm from the coast. Units of the
7th Fleet were assigned to MARKET TIME duty at the same time as providing NGS for
Allied forces. Headquarters for the operation was the Surveillance Operations Center in
Saigon, with a string of nine coastal surveillance centres responsible for local direction
of operations. These changes in organisation and responsibility did not immediately
increase interceptions and, following a review of MARKET TIME in September 1965,
more resources were assigned to all patrol zones. 806
By the time RAN destroyers appeared, the organisation was working well and the steady
work of the RVN Navy, USN and US Coast Guard patrol craft had reduced NVA coastal
infiltration attempts to a trickle. 807 However, the task of ensuring that the many thousands
of craft in Vietnamese coastal waters had a legitimate reason for being there continued.
A heavier responsibility was taken by the patrolling destroyers after an April 1969
decision that 7th Fleet ships would take up the slack when inshore patrol vessels were
released for riverine operations, and that the outer aerial patrols would be discontinued.
The main contribution by RAN ships was in maintaining a surface plot from which other
MARKET TIME patrol forces could be directed into interceptions, but on occasion RAN
ships took a direct role in MARKET TIME and destroyed WBLCs attempting to land in
the RVN. 808 Subsidiary tasks were the rendering of lifesaving and medical assistance
to Vietnamese craft. 809
Intelligence support to MARKET TIME has been described in the CDT 3 section. It
became possible for coastal surveillance centres to direct cooperating warships into
positions to intercept WBLCs on the basis of intelligence analysis, and there was also a
strong correlation between areas of enemy activity and resupply efforts. The VC strongly
dominated the area south of Quang Ngai, which was a suspected area of frequent
infiltration from the sea, land access being denied or hindered by Allied ground force
activities. To this extent, the NGS task and the contribution to MARKET TIME were
complementary. Indeed, the October 1970 interception of WBLCs by Perth occurred during
a scheduled period of H&I firings not far from Quang Ngai. This kind of intelligence,
painstakingly built up through cooperation between ground and coastal intelligence
agencies, could generate excellent results if applied intelligently.
On the gunline — ngs in south Vietnam
The need for NGS for ground forces was recognised in 1965 when operations by the
US Marine Corps and ARVN in coastal regions began. Initially opposed by the RVN
Government, the bombardment of enemy positions from the sea was approved in mid-
1965, and continued as a feature of the war until the withdrawal of Allied naval forces. 810
As in Korea, the flexibility of NGS commended itself to Army and Marine units as a
supplement to and, on occasion, a substitute for organic artillery, although provincial
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