Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

258 Missing Pieces
Intelligence also noted that the VC tended to lay low during daylight, becoming active
around 1700. This trait necessitated the adoption of night attacks. 831
Because of a reassignment of the 135th to the 222nd Aviation Battalion, another
relocation — this time to Camp Bearcat in Bien Hoa Province — occurred in November
1968. The move introduced the unit to operations in IV Corps as well as in
III Corps. Map 28, taken from Marolda & Fitzgerald, Vietnam Conflict, shows the unit’s
general area of operations from this period on. Ground-force operations in the latter
half of 1968 had had the desired effect of breaking up enemy formations into smaller
companies or platoons.
Beginning in 1969, Allied formations acting on intelligence to gain contact with these
forces would call in strikes by helicopter gunships to help destroy, disperse or capture
these smaller VC parties. These so-called ‘Eagle’ flights were immediately effective and
enabled the 135th to settle some scores. The VC were not always less of a threat when
in retreat, but it was easier to fire effectively on a unit on the move than in ambush. 832
As well, some areas where a VC presence was known would be declared ‘free fire’
zones, into which any helicopter could fire at will.
Another source of AHC intelligence was the information gathered by ‘swing ships’,
single slicks sent out to liaise with the ARVN units the 135th and other companies in
the battalion were supporting. ARVN staff would join the helicopter and then be flown to
nearby villages, where they would discuss sightings or evidence of VC with the village
chiefs. ‘At that time the loyalties of the local population were often dependent on who
was closest to the village and what would result in the greatest benefit or chance of
unhindered survival to them’. 833
This information, too, was passed back to HQ Battalion for evaluation and correlation,
not to the AHC, and was more likely to be reflected in the operation orders two days
later than in orders for the following day. But in many cases, the AHC continued to
collect its own intelligence on the enemy:
Our familiarity with the terrain, population habits, vegetation etc. often
proved valuable in alerting flights … As an example, new footprints
could be seen in wet areas from a height of about 1500 feet. Disturbed
vegetation was a sure sign that someone had been in the immediate
area shortly before. 834
Most intelligence support to the 135th’s troop insertion operations was thus either
invisible to the aircrew or ad hoc. Exceptions to this rule were the relatively infrequent
missions flown by the company in support of the USN SEALs. These were planned
and briefed most carefully, as they relied for their success on the use of the minimum
force size and as much stealth as could be coaxed out of the noisy UH-1 helicopter.
Good intelligence and its correct application to the operations were essential, and the