Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

180 Missing Pieces
Outcomes
Korea was the first military test for the UN, one that exposed the inherent uncertainties
of using that organisation as a vehicle for enforcing international decisions through
complex multilateral operations. At a strategic level, this may have been the spur
that drove succeeding Australian governments to redouble their efforts in the field of
multilateral treaty-making in the five years after 1950, which resulted in Australia’s
accession to the Australia—New Zealand—United States (ANZUS) Treaty, South East
Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), ANZAM, and the establishment of the Far East
Strategic Reserve.
Operationally, the war was an excellent example of the successful application of
sea power. With the exception of a small number of delays to operations caused
by minefields in the first months of the war, the UN naval forces seized and held
command of the seas contiguous to the Korean Peninsula throughout the conflict.
This was a prerequisite in the US decision to oppose the NKPA invasion; without it
such a decision would have been untenable. 570 The Communist forces had no strategy,
except for mining and the use of coastal batteries, to challenge this command: it was
as if the sea had become ‘enemy territory’ for them. 571 Using this advantage, the UN
naval command was able to deliver or to threaten amphibious assault upon enemy-held
territory; to withdraw or resupply UN forces as required; to interdict the enemy’s coastal
towns, defences and transport infrastructure; and to defend and contest possession
of offshore islands.
As a strategic outcome, the RAN’s performance in Korea, together with that of the
other two Australian Services, assisted in cementing Australia’s defence ties with the
United States. The Australian Government was able to turn the professionalism of its
armed forces to advantage in its dealings with the United States, while also sharing a
greater concern for events in East Asia than many other Commonwealth countries. 572
Although this in itself did not diminish the pro-British stance of the Australian prime
minister, it did contribute towards the conclusion of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951 and to
an Australian recognition that Japan was not the enemy it had to face. ANZUS might
well have come into being without Korea, but the war - and Australian’s contribution
to it - accelerated the process. 573 Australia’s active role in the UN agencies charged
with overseeing the Korean situation also assisted in raising the value of Australia’s
participation above the level its relatively minor military contributions might have
allowed. 574
At the operational level, its participation in the Korean War was an early test of the
RAN’s capability to field and support a force at a considerable distance from home bases,
and of its ability to sustain a steady stream of trained crews and battle-ready ships to
relieve those already deployed. Both aspects caused ACNB grave difficulties. The nature
of the operations undertaken also imposed harsh tests on the RAN’s professionalism,
all of which were passed with flying colours. In Korea, the RAN fielded the first of its