Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
798 Targets fell into three categories—those near populated areas (for which spotting aircraft were
mandatory), those on coastal logistics routes, and coastal defence sites. [Fairfax, Navy in
Vietnam, p. 29.] As a further demonstration of USN confidence in the RAN ships, Perth held
CTU responsibilities for SEA DRAGON for 59 out of the 80-odd days spent on that station.
[AWM SO1704, Interview with Rear Admiral Doyle, Commanding Officer HMAS Perth.]
799 Fairfax, Navy in Vietnam, P. 60 and Grey, Up top, pp. 175—183.
800 ‘We were getting requests for five rounds or ten rounds at 15 targets overnight on intelligence
we didn’t know about’. [Leach interview.]
801 Sharp, Report, pp. 51—52, and Fairfax, Navy in Vietnam, p. 51. This was the aim of the operation.
Some measure of the effectiveness of SEA DRAGON can be seen in the huge increase in
WBLC activity observed by the 7th Fleet during the 1967 Tet (8—13 February) ceasefire, and
the low levels of activity recorded at the end of 1967.
802 On 18 September 1967 a shell from a NVA coastal defence site hit Perth, causing slight
damage and injuring four sailors; the ship continued its mission. [AWM78, Item 292/5 —
HMAS Perth Report of Proceedings, September 1967.] This was the only damage caused to
any RAN ship by coastal batteries during the war. For its part, the NVA made concerted
efforts to lure SEA DRAGON units into positions where they could be taken under effective
fire, and the calibre of the guns mounted in coastal defence sites had reached 100mm and
even 130mm by October 1967. This reflected a sharp elevation in the level of concern felt
by the NVA over the effectiveness of SEA DRAGON. [Fairfax, Navy in Vietnam, p. 44.]
803 AWM78, Item 292/6 — HMAS Perth Report of Proceedings, February 1968. Between 14 February and
1 March 1968, Perth assumed command of all SEA DRAGON surface units.
804 Marolda & Fitzgerald, Vietnam Conflict, pp. 166—169.
805 The incident that triggered this response was the discovery of a camouflaged steel-hulled
ship at Vung Ro in Phu Yen Province on 16 February 1965. The cargo included an arsenal
of weapons and ammunition and half a tonne of medical supplies. [BDM Corporation,
Operational Analyses, pp. 7—16.]
806 RL Schreadley, From the Rivers to the Sea: The United States Navy in Vietnam, Naval Institute
Press, Annapolis, Md, 1992, pp. 88—89.
807 MARKET TIME was credited with reducing NVA seaborne supply to only 10 per cent of the
total. In 1967 daily searches for the whole MARKET TIME area totalled about 1500. [BDM
Corporation, Operational Analyses, p. 7, 18—19.]
808 On 26 December 1969 Vendetta tracked two WBLCs to the vicinity of a beach in Quang
Ngai Province where intelligence had reported recent tracks. She engaged and destroyed
them while they were unloading stores. [AWM78, Item 352/9 — HMAS Vendetta Report of
Proceedings, December 1969.] A similar incident saw Perth destroy two of three WBLCs
attempting to land at night on the coast near the DMZ on 8 October 1970. [AWM78, Item
292/7—HMAS Perth Report of Proceedings, October 1970.]
809 Fairfax, Navy in Vietnam, p. 71, and Grey, Up Top, p.138. Grey noted the comments of the
RAN Director of Plans, who visited Vietnam in 1968, to the effect that the RAN had missed
an opportunity by not offering an inshore surveillance force. Coming on the heels of the
experience gathered by the 16th Minesweeping Squadron in its patrol operations during
Confrontation, it was an opportunity twice missed.
810 BDM Corporation, Operational Analyses, p. 7—48.
811 The ANGLICO party comprised a liaison section with the headquarters of the force being
supported and several spotting teams in the field. [Fairfax, Navy in Vietnam, p. 27.]
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