Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

a uniTed naTiOns ‘POlice acTiOn’: kORea 1950–53
new technology ships, the Battle class, and exercised its first and only application of
live fixed-wing airpower. In general, the results were impressive. However, the war
also showed once again the technological disparities between the RAN’s equipment
and that of the USN. 575
Korea enabled the RAN to demonstrate the utility of conventional naval forces:
the blockade imposed by the UN naval command was almost totally successful in
denying the use of the sea to Communist operations. The dull but essential work of
maintaining a blockade — getting to know the waters, establishing what is normal and
usual, establishing relations with the local population, and conducting a succession of
boardings and searches — was an indication of what was to come, and should have been
reflected in the RAN’s force structure development. 576 The demonstrated effectiveness
of mines laid by as unsophisticated an enemy as the NKPA drew the RAN’s attention to
its deficiencies in combating this weapon. CNS Rear Admiral Collins raised this concern
in a letter to First Sea Lord Fraser on 6 October 1950, but it was not until August 1961
that the first new minesweepers were commissioned into the RAN. 577
The Korean War gave no RAN officer much experience of operational level command,
and none in staff duties. 578 There may have been opportunities to attach RAN officers
to COMNAVFE staff, just as coalition officers were attached to the Far East Command,
but there is no evidence this was considered in RAN circles. 579 Operational commanders
once more encountered language problems in their attempts to cooperate with ROK
regular and irregular forces. The responsibility for bridging the language gap was left
to others, an attitude which was to reappear in succeeding conflicts.
Turning to intelligence, Korea provided little by way of improvement for the RAN.
Commanding Officers of HMA Ships were keenly aware of the lack of intelligence
they might like to have on their enemy provided through formal UN naval command
channels, and they showed some degree of resourcefulness in getting it where they
could. However, the war provided little by way of experience for the RAN or the
Australian Defence intelligence organisations, neither of which had any responsibilities
for supporting the operational forces, and whose officers were not involved in the UN
intelligence collection, analysis or dissemination apparatus. As both COMNAVFE and
FO2ICFES were initially gravely embarrassed by a shortage of skilled intelligence
personnel, an offer by Australia or the RAN of staff to assist in the provision of
intelligence support to operational forces could only have been welcomed. For whatever
reasons, an offer was not made: an opportunity to cement the operational intelligence
relationships and to give Australian personnel experience in the ‘combat intelligence’
field was thus lost.
Finally, and with a clear acknowledgment that detailed information on the subject is
sketchy, Korea taught the Western alliance lessons about the adequacy of its Sigint
coverage and cryptanalysis capabilities. As part of its UKUSA obligations, Australia
had accepted regional Sigint responsibilities: Korea was not one of these, but southern
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