Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

264 Missing Pieces
RANHFV operated in a very different environment, where operations were conducted
on the basis of somebody else’s planning, using intelligence the AHC had not seen. This
led the company on occasion into horrendous circumstances from which only personnel
skills and resolve could extricate the aircraft and their precious cargoes. If anything,
theirs was an example of insufficient intelligence support for operations, but the 135th
AHC was ‘only a small cog in a big machine’. Despite this drawback, the professionalism
of the RAN element of the 135th enabled it to earn a high reputation for efficiency,
which in turn led to it being called upon to take on more numerous and more difficult
missions. The levels of fatigue this engendered could have been more serious for a less
well-organised formation.
The destroyers on the gunline enjoyed the benefits of working within a professional and
operational milieu. Sound intelligence was just one of the tools issued by the US 7th
Fleet for the task, so much so that few of the veterans even recall it being there — good
operational intelligence was so consistently provided that it was taken for granted. It
only became an issue when it was not there, such as for Hobart at Tiger Island.
The RAN’s ability to match the tasks set with the appropriate mix of experienced and
skilled manpower should also be remarked upon, as it stands in marked contrast to
the RAN’s readiness for the demands of previous campaigns, such as the war against
Japan and the Korean conflict. In Vietnam, it was the US forces that had to deal with
the problems of equipment obsolescence and inadequately trained personnel, and the
consequences of both. The RAN units sent to Vietnam were fully trained and manned,
and the fact that only discrete segments of the RAN were engaged meant the best of its
manpower could be sent. But the RAN had only one war to fight. 845 Again, however, this
preparedness did not extend to intelligence personnel. There were few naval officers in
that professional calling, and none who could be spared to assist the USN.
Despite very creditable performances by RAN commanding officers in discharging often
onerous responsibilities as CTUs, no opportunities were apparently presented or created
for senior RAN officers to gain experience in the workings of a large fleet staff. Ironically,
good officers were attached to SEATO Headquarters, but their work was ultimately in
vain for, despite all the planning put in by the organisation in defending its ‘protocol
states’, its services were not required. SEATO was divided on the issue of intervention
in Vietnam, and South Vietnam never asked for SEATO assistance. 846
Once more, the development of language skills for the RAN’s operational forces in
Vietnam was totally inadequate, especially for CDT 3 and RANHFV. Both were wholly
reliant on the availability of English-speaking Vietnamese or USN advisers to gain
intelligence and conduct operations in support of ARVN. Yet the situation in Vietnam
had been of concern to the Australian Government and the Defence Committee from the
late 1950s, and the first requests for military assistance had been made in 1962, five
years before RAN elements were committed.