Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

PROPPing uP a dOMinO: VieTnaM 1967–71
force being inserted were killed or wounded during disembarkation. In the melee all
of the slicks were hit, and the air commander, Lieutenant Commander WP James,
RAN, was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for his part in the ensuing rescue
operation. 838
January 1970 saw the introduction of a new form of interdiction aimed at the VC and
NVA units using infiltration routes into South Vietnam from Cambodia. Intelligence
revealed the routes in use, and a C&C aircraft would fly low to illuminate the trails
with a searchlight. On detection of movement, a second helicopter would drop flares
and two gunships would strafe the area. It is not clear whether these operations were
speculative or triggered as the result of detections by sensors implanted along the
trails. The impression is that the intelligence support for these missions came from a
combination of implanted sensors, photo reconnaissance and Sigint. The risk to aircraft
was as much from the physical environment as from the enemy as at least one 135th
gunship collided with a tree but was able to return to base. 839
By September 1970, the 13th had made another relocation, this time to Dong Tam in Dinh
Tuong Province, the site of a major USN riverine warfare base. The base attracted much
VC attention, and the AHC came under fire many times. This part of its service in Vietnam
saw the 135th involved in a number of riverine operations in the Delta area and against VC
located in the U Minh Forest. As in the case of the destroyers providing NGS in support
of these operations, the helicopters had the benefit of sensor intelligence, but exploiting it
was not easy, and the well-entrenched VC were able to make insertions very costly for the
slicks. This was not so much an inadequacy of the intelligence provided, but a measure of
the enemy’s intelligence on how to disable US Army helicopters.
In May 1971, it was decided not to replace the RANHFV, and the RAN aircrew ceased
flying operations on 8 June, departing the country via Vung Tau shortly afterwards. The
experimental military unit was at an end. Within the company, the contribution made
individually and collectively by the RAN aircrew had been enormous. The RAN personnel
were not only better trained but had more military experience than many of the US Army
replacement personnel, and as a consequence it was not uncommon for RAN personnel of
quite modest rank to hold a position of higher responsibility in the 135th AHC. 840
The war-fighting experience gained by RANHFV was unique and of a far higher level than
those RAN and RAAF aircrew who flew almost exclusively with the RAAF 9 Squadron
in support of 1ATF. The environment was vastly different from the oceanic battlefield of
ASW, and the tactics were also a far remove from the role for which the RAN personnel
had been trained. However, the application of intelligence was not that much different.
Aircraft commanders were accustomed to take decisions on fleeting sonar contacts and
accept the responsibility for initiating immediate action. RAN ASW helicopters could and
did exercise control over other helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, and even ships in certain
operational circumstances. For RANHFV personnel, it was the operational environment
that was different as submarines rarely shoot back.
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