Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

66 Missing Pieces
and powerful ships to the task of convoy escort, denying local operational commanders
the chance to oppose the Japanese with any reasonable forces. Ironically, it was the
Americans who had strongly urged the concentration strategy in staff talks in April 1941.
After the Japanese attacked the Philippines, however, they declined to assign the Asiatic
Fleet to ABDACOM and selected for themselves an operating area east of Java. 186
However, there were just too few forces to deploy across a battleground a thousand miles
wide against an enemy advancing in four major columns, and the strain of defeat soon
affected the relationships between the Allies. By 12 February Wavell was delegating
his responsibilities to Admiral Helfrich, while Admiral Hart asked to be relieved as
ABDAFLOAT, which occurred on 16 February, with Helfrich succeeding Hart. After the
failure of the Striking Force under Dutch Rear Admiral Doorman to intercept the Japanese
convoy intending to land at Palembang in Sumatra on 15 February, Wavell told Churchill
that the Netherlands East Indies was lost, and the following day the British Defence
Committee terminated all reinforcements for Java. On 19 February the Japanese landed
in Bali, brushing aside a joint Dutch-USN striking force, again under Doorman, and on
21 February Helfrich appealed to Wavell for additional naval forces to defend Java. The
request was declined on the grounds of air inferiority. Two days later Wavell advised
Churchill that ‘the defence of ABDA has broken down and Java cannot last long’. On
23 February ABDACOM was dissolved, leaving the Dutch to carry on with the forces
then available. The United States and Britain had made commitments to joint action
with the Dutch that were now worthless.
The scene was now set for the final two naval battles of this sorry campaign. Although
its command structure was in chaos, ABDA’s intelligence services were still providing
a clear picture of Japanese intentions. The IJN had formed two attack groups for their
assault on Java. The western group of some 41 transports, with powerful naval covering
forces, was advancing southwards towards the western extremity of Java at Sunda
Strait. Aircraft confirmed its existence, composition and direction on 26 February. The
eastern force left Balikpapan in Borneo bound for the north coast of Java near Surabaya.
It was not sighted until north of Surabaya on 27 February.
Helfrich’s problem was marshalling sufficient force to effectively oppose these Japanese
amphibious thrusts, as both ships and aircraft were in short supply. He had formed his
available assets into the Eastern and Western striking forces, with Collins commanding
the Western force, mainly comprising obsolete ships, and Doorman commanding the
more modern ships of the Eastern force. To meet what was correctly deemed the most
imminent Japanese threat — he was particularly anxious that the convoy be destroyed
— Helfrich rushed available reinforcements in the form of one heavy and one light
cruiser and two destroyers from Tanjong Priok, the port of Jakarta, to join Doorman’s
force at Surabaya on 26 February. Sailing to intercept the Japanese but lacking air
reconnaissance, Doorman was at first unable to locate the enemy, and then in a fierce
fight into the night hours, his force was severely mauled by the convoy’s close escort.