Missing Pieces: - Royal Australian Navy

nOTes
404 NAA MP1185/8, Item 2037/7/550 — HMA Ships — Requirements for Improving Fighting
Efficiency, AF letter 436/586/11 of 30 July 1943.
405 NAA MP1185/8, Item 2037/7/550 — HMA Ships — Requirements for Improving Fighting
Efficiency, AF letter 436/586/11 of 30 July 1943.
406 Cooper, ‘RAN and Allied Command’.
407 NAA MP1049/5, Item 2049/7/810 — TF 44Diary of Proceedings 21 November—21 December
1942.
408 Crutchley thought that the Japanese would not attack Milne Bay with a force inferior to his
own, and if it did attack the IJN would field something vastly superior to TF 44. There was
therefore not much to be gained by hanging around in the Coral Sea. ‘Task Force 44 engaged,
as it is at present, is in my opinion, wearing machinery, expending oil fuel and denying a
period which could be used to great advantage in improving the fighting efficiency of the
ships and in overhauling so that breakdowns will not impair that efficiency’. [AWM 188,
Item 22—Task Force 44 (Research by Mr Ware), 7.]
409 NACP RG38, Box 1701 — Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII action
and operational reports—Australian Squadron: CTF 74 letter AF 1060/33 of 6 March 1944
addressed C7F.
410 Allied Sigint revealed that Japanese reconnaissance aircraft from Sorong had identified three
battleships amongst the Allied landing force. [NAA B5553/1, Item whole of series (cat. C-file
3)—Periodic Sigint summaries Dec 42—Feb 44, summary of 2 June 1944.]
411 This force comprised six destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral Sakonju Naomasa.
One was sunk in this action, but the remaining five continued with their mission of
reinforcement. [Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, pp. 125—126.]
412 The US destroyers fired 2005 rounds of 5-inch ammunition at the IJN. The closest any Allied
ship got to the Japanese was 10,500 yards. Although the Japanese used smoke skillfully and
returned fire inaccurately, it must have been disappointing that no significant hits were
scored on them. [Crutchley Report, p. 10.]
413 While Crutchley retained his key staff officers from Savo, only his original staff officer
operations, was at Biak
414 The minutes of the meeting are in AF letter 1063/21 of 22 May 1944. [NAA B6121/3, Item
70B — Operation HORLICKS—Biak 25—27 May 1944—CTF 74 Report.]
415 Even with four of his ships newly joined, on the night of 8 June Crutchley was able to
order an anti-surface disposition. He later recorded that a subsequent order to the newly
joined destroyer squadron commander ‘was not received’. [Crutchley Report p. 6.] Morison
suggested that this was an instance of a Nelsonian telescope to the blind eye by an eager
commander with an enemy in his sights. [Morison, New Guinea and the Marianas, p.127.]
Whichever the correct explanation, there were no other communications difficulties during
the action.
416 NACP RG38, Box 1701 — Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, WWII action
and operational reports—Australian Squadron, CTF 74 letter AF 1050/9 of 13 January 1944
addressed CINC US Fleet (King). Crutchley responded to a report by USS Phoenix stating
that the British Type 281 radar in Shropshire was superior to the US equivalent because
of that ship’s excellent performance. He made the point that it was not the radar but the
operators that made the difference and subsequently arranged for US cruiser radar teams
to train with his so as to improve the performance of the entire TF.
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